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Partial Success? Pension Reform under the Moon Jae-in Administration in South Korea

  • Analyses & Alternatives
  • Abbr : A&A
  • 2026, 10(1), pp.163~184
  • DOI : 10.22931/aanda.2026.10.1.006
  • Publisher : Korea Consensus Institute
  • Research Area : Social Science > Social Science in general
  • Received : January 24, 2026
  • Accepted : February 5, 2026
  • Published : February 28, 2026

KIM, Won-Sub 1

1고려대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

This study examines the dynamics of pension reform in South Korea through an analysis of the Moon Jae-in administration’s pension policies. Previous research has emphasized the role of collective actors such as bureaucrats, employers, labor unions, and civic organizations, but has not sufficiently addressed the impact of partisan orientation of government on the reform process. To fill this gap, the study proposes an analytical framework that integrates partisan theory, party competition, and veto player theory, thereby considering both partisan preferences and institutional constraints simultaneously. The analysis reveals that the basic pension reform was implemented earlier than expected. This outcome can be attributed to the limited number of veto players, the relatively small differences in their positions, and the fact that political competition functioned as a condition that accelerated reform. In contrast the national pension reform—despite two rounds of social dialogue—failed to reach consensus and remained at the stage of prolonged discussion. This was due to the large number of veto players, the significant divergence in their positions, and the persistence of major collective actors in maintaining their own stances. These findings demonstrate that the success or failure of pension reform is not determined solely by the partisan orientation of the government, but rather by the combined influence of institutional conditions and political competition.

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