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@article{ART002107319},
author={Kwang Ho Chun},
title={Low Intensive Conflict and Military Force Failure: - The Soviet War in Afghanistan -},
journal={Crisisonomy},
issn={2466-1198},
year={2016},
volume={12},
number={4},
pages={53-72}

TY - JOUR
AU - Kwang Ho Chun
TI - Low Intensive Conflict and Military Force Failure: - The Soviet War in Afghanistan -
JO - Crisisonomy
PY - 2016
VL - 12
IS - 4
PB - Crisis and Emergency Management: Theory and Praxis
SP - 53
EP - 72
SN - 2466-1198
AB - This study analyzes the field of low intensity conflict from a different angle. Its primary goal was to examine how the gaps between the degrees of preparation of a military force towards low intensity conflict and high intensity conflict could be filled. However, the data sources for this study were scarce and new critical questions which have been neglected in the literature has risen: why does this type of war become so common in recent years, and why did the armed forces rarely win? This study leads to the conclusion that low intensity conflict has been perceived as inferior compared to high intensity conflicts, which is the main reason why regular military forces repeatedly find themselves unprepared for this type of conflicts.
KW - low intensive conflict;military force;Soviet;Afghanistan;Mujahidin
DO -
UR -
ER -

Kwang Ho Chun. (2016). Low Intensive Conflict and Military Force Failure: - The Soviet War in Afghanistan -. Crisisonomy, 12(4), 53-72.

Kwang Ho Chun. 2016, "Low Intensive Conflict and Military Force Failure: - The Soviet War in Afghanistan -", Crisisonomy, vol.12, no.4 pp.53-72.

Kwang Ho Chun "Low Intensive Conflict and Military Force Failure: - The Soviet War in Afghanistan -" Crisisonomy 12.4 pp.53-72 (2016) : 53.

Kwang Ho Chun. Low Intensive Conflict and Military Force Failure: - The Soviet War in Afghanistan -. 2016; 12(4), 53-72.

Kwang Ho Chun. "Low Intensive Conflict and Military Force Failure: - The Soviet War in Afghanistan -" Crisisonomy 12, no.4 (2016) : 53-72.

Kwang Ho Chun. Low Intensive Conflict and Military Force Failure: - The Soviet War in Afghanistan -. Crisisonomy, 12(4), 53-72.

Kwang Ho Chun. Low Intensive Conflict and Military Force Failure: - The Soviet War in Afghanistan -. Crisisonomy. 2016; 12(4) 53-72.

Kwang Ho Chun. Low Intensive Conflict and Military Force Failure: - The Soviet War in Afghanistan -. 2016; 12(4), 53-72.

Kwang Ho Chun. "Low Intensive Conflict and Military Force Failure: - The Soviet War in Afghanistan -" Crisisonomy 12, no.4 (2016) : 53-72.