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Analyzing the Lawmaking Process of the Sewol Special Law by Evolutionary Game Theory - The Flows of Social Disaster Issues and Policy - making Process of Responsibility Attribution -

  • Crisisonomy
  • Abbr : KRCEM
  • 2016, 12(6), pp.67~81
  • Publisher : Crisis and Emergency Management: Theory and Praxis
  • Research Area : Social Science > Public Policy > Public Policy in general

Hyeon, Seung-Hyo 1,  Sang Il Ryu 2,  Lee, Min-Kyu ORD ID 1

1충북대학교
2동의대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

The sinking of the Sewol Ferry in 2014 sparked conflicts between various stakeholders in Korea. While the government, ruling party and conservative groups treated it as one of the common traffic “accidents”, the bereaved families and civic (liberal) groups argued it was a “tragedy” which the government should be solely responsible for. Although the opposition party represented the views of the families and civic groups, the bill of the Sewol special law was passed by the Congress in favor of the position of the government and ruling party. Why did the opposition party draft the bill that reflects that position? Why were the families and civic groups eventually forced to accept the agreement, contrary to their preferences? In this study, we reaffirm the preference asymmetry theory that the player with a narrow preference wins the game against the player with a wide preference. We then compare the evolution process with the result of preference asymmetry through the evolutionary game theory.

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