This paper examines Samantabhadra’s critique of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇavāda) in verses 41–54 of Chapter 3 of the Āptamīmāṃsā (ĀM). The ĀM is a polemical text that establishes the authority of the omniscient one (āpta) by critically examining one-sided doctrines advanced by rival schools, while at the same time articulating the legitimacy of the Jaina doctrines of syādvāda and anekāntavāda. Chapter 3 addresses the opposition between permanence and impermanence, and Buddhist momentariness is presented in this chapter as a representative case of the absolutization of impermanence.
Rather than treating verses 41–54 as a simple sequence of separate thematic units, this paper reconstructs them in terms of their argumentative structure by distinguishing between Samantabhadra’s direct critique of momentariness and his rebuttal of possible Buddhist responses. In this reconstruction, the critique focuses on three major issues. First, it problematizes temporal identity and continuity through the examples of recognition(pratyabhijñā) and post-mortem existence. Second, it raises the issue of causal determination and necessity, asking how a specific effect can be linked to a specific cause if all entities are absolutely momentary. Third, it exposes the moral difficulties implied by momentariness, especially with regard to the relation between intention and action, bondage and liberation, and action and karmic result.
At the same time, Samantabhadra anticipates Buddhist defensive strategies based on santāna, saṃvṛti, and avācya, and argues that as long as absolute momentariness is maintained, such auxiliary concepts cannot ultimately resolve the problems of continuity, identity, and attribution. The paper thus argues that the target of the ĀM is not impermanence as such, but a one-sided ontology that absolutizes change as the whole of reality. In this way, Samantabhadra’s critique of momentariness functions not merely as an anti-Buddhist refutation, but as a positive argumentative device for establishing the philosophical necessity of conditional predication and the Jaina doctrine of many-sided reality.