@article{ART003399537},
author={Yulhui Cho},
title={Can a Visual Cognition Distorted by Jaundice Be a Pramāṇa? Buddhist Proponent(s) of the Theory of Partial Trustworthiness},
journal={불교학리뷰},
issn={1975-2660},
year={2026},
number={40},
pages={9-32},
doi={10.29213/crbs..40.202610.9}
TY - JOUR
AU - Yulhui Cho
TI - Can a Visual Cognition Distorted by Jaundice Be a Pramāṇa? Buddhist Proponent(s) of the Theory of Partial Trustworthiness
JO - 불교학리뷰
PY - 2026
VL - null
IS - 40
PB - Geumgang Center for Buddhist Studies
SP - 9
EP - 32
SN - 1975-2660
AB - In the Buddhist epistemological tradition, perception (pratyakṣa) was established as a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) through Dignāga’s (ca. 6th c.) definition of perception as “free from conceptualization” (kalpanāpoḍha). Dharmakīrti (ca. 7th c.) subsequently added the qualifier “non-erroneous” (abhrānta). Under this definition, the jaundice-induced cognition of a white conch shell as yellow should be excluded from perception because it arises from an impaired sense faculty. Several Buddhist commentators report, however, that “some of our own school” accepted even this cognition as a means of valid cognition. Previous studies (Funayama 1999; Chu 2004; Steinkellner 2005, etc.) have examined the attribution of this theory—the so-called aṃśasaṃvādavāda, or “theory of partial trustworthiness”—to Jinendrabuddhi (ca. 8th c.). Yet the theoretical basis for this position—why an erroneous cognition should nonetheless count as perception—remains insufficiently clarified. Through an analysis of the relevant passage, PSṬ 62,10–65,6, this paper demonstrates that the aṃśasaṃvādavāda is constructed from within the very system developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The theory can be understood as a radical position arising from the tension between Dignāga’s definition of perception and Dharmakīrti’s new pramāṇa system, although Buddhist commentators consistently treated it as a marginal view. By examining the strategies through which the commentarial tradition distanced itself from the aṃśasaṃvādavāda, this paper shows how the Buddhist theory ofperception developed dynamically through processes of hermeneutical accommodation.
KW - Jinendrabuddhi;aṃśasaṃvādavāda;pramāṇa;pratyakṣa;kāmala
DO - 10.29213/crbs..40.202610.9
ER -
Yulhui Cho. (2026). Can a Visual Cognition Distorted by Jaundice Be a Pramāṇa? Buddhist Proponent(s) of the Theory of Partial Trustworthiness. 불교학리뷰, 40, 9-32.
Yulhui Cho. 2026, "Can a Visual Cognition Distorted by Jaundice Be a Pramāṇa? Buddhist Proponent(s) of the Theory of Partial Trustworthiness", 불교학리뷰, no.40, pp.9-32. Available from: doi:10.29213/crbs..40.202610.9
Yulhui Cho "Can a Visual Cognition Distorted by Jaundice Be a Pramāṇa? Buddhist Proponent(s) of the Theory of Partial Trustworthiness" 불교학리뷰 40 pp.9-32 (2026) : 9.
Yulhui Cho. Can a Visual Cognition Distorted by Jaundice Be a Pramāṇa? Buddhist Proponent(s) of the Theory of Partial Trustworthiness. 2026; 40 : 9-32. Available from: doi:10.29213/crbs..40.202610.9
Yulhui Cho. "Can a Visual Cognition Distorted by Jaundice Be a Pramāṇa? Buddhist Proponent(s) of the Theory of Partial Trustworthiness" 불교학리뷰 no.40(2026) : 9-32.doi: 10.29213/crbs..40.202610.9
Yulhui Cho. Can a Visual Cognition Distorted by Jaundice Be a Pramāṇa? Buddhist Proponent(s) of the Theory of Partial Trustworthiness. 불교학리뷰, 40, 9-32. doi: 10.29213/crbs..40.202610.9
Yulhui Cho. Can a Visual Cognition Distorted by Jaundice Be a Pramāṇa? Buddhist Proponent(s) of the Theory of Partial Trustworthiness. 불교학리뷰. 2026; 40 9-32. doi: 10.29213/crbs..40.202610.9
Yulhui Cho. Can a Visual Cognition Distorted by Jaundice Be a Pramāṇa? Buddhist Proponent(s) of the Theory of Partial Trustworthiness. 2026; 40 : 9-32. Available from: doi:10.29213/crbs..40.202610.9
Yulhui Cho. "Can a Visual Cognition Distorted by Jaundice Be a Pramāṇa? Buddhist Proponent(s) of the Theory of Partial Trustworthiness" 불교학리뷰 no.40(2026) : 9-32.doi: 10.29213/crbs..40.202610.9
