2013, Vol., No.15

PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.5

pISSN : 1975-1621 / eISSN : 2092-0873
https://journal.kci.go.kr/insewtdgu

This paper aims to explicate Spinoza’s notion of ‘duration’ presented in chapter 8 of Alexandre Lefebvre’s The Image of Law. I use, according to Lefebvre’s way, Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, and try to keep up with the process in which Spinoza explains the ‘duration’. I draw from this process the conclusion that the ‘duration’ penetrates the internal and external aspects of modes. Also by way of considering the problem of ‘time’ from that process, I assert that the ‘time’ is not a mere illusion. In that respect Spinoza’s argument on ‘duration’ and ‘time’ generates the problem of the ‘encounter of modes’. Although this ‘encounter’ is seen as a contingency, it has a series of necessity. In order to demonstrate that the encounter is necessary, however, I assert that although both the ‘duration’ and the ‘time’ are only produced from an imagination of the human idea, these products of the imagination include a kind of essential elements, and this indicates that the modes as the affections of substance finally contain a kind of essential elements. And then I argue that the positive aspects of these encounters constitute the ‘common notions’. In this way, I conclude that the ‘common notions’ in Spinoza are the only way to vindicate the positive duration of the finite modes.

The main objective of this essay is to explore the ideas and arguments of The Image of Law that are relevant to Kant’s theory of judgment. According to Lefebre, the author of The Image of Law, Kant’s theory of judgment is recently revived in the modern juridical discernment by Hart, Dworkin etc. Although two theorists guarantee some creativity in law and adjudication, they take encounters to be instances of the universal in order to extend an original system. This subsumptive character is the very inheritance of Kant that essentially suppresses and excludes creativity out of juridical judgment. Lefebre insists that creativity and invention are intrinsic to adjudication dint of activating Deleuze’s key theme. The secondary objective of this article is to attempt to read Kant’s moral judgment focusing on application and creation. The emphasis is placed on the issue as to whether or not the moral judgment in Kant excludes creativity and merely repeats the law, while seeking the possibility of creativity in Kant’s theory of judgment.

In this article, chiefly considering Yi T'oegye's Dosan Seodang(陶山書堂) Garden based on his mindfulness(Kyong; 敬), I attempted to find a method of understanding the construction of the Korean traditional garden in the view of the Confucian thoughts. It has been often said that the gardens are closely related to the Confucian thoughts: however such an idea falls into a vague inference. I proposed the three features of representation, relation, and cultivation which are the representative ideas of Confucianism, and confirmed the relevance of them to the construction of the Korean traditional garden. In the first chapter I summarized the general meaning of Dosan Seodang Garden and the Confucian thoughts, and as an example, suggested the Confucian educational essence of Sewon school. I tried to understand the Confucian thoughts of representation and relation and the Dosan Seodang Garden itself in the other two chapters. In the fourth chapter I finally characterized the Dosan Seodang Garden as a unique place for the Confucian cultivation. Thus I affirmed the intrinsic role of Yi T'oegye's mindfulness(Kyong) in the Dosan Seodang Garden. In conclusion I am assured that in the Dosan Seodang Garden there exist such Confucian features of representation, relation and cultivation. This article surely will provide an opportunity to study the meaning of the construction of the Korean traditional garden.