KJCKorea
Journal Central

This paper offers a Bayesian critique of Joshua Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment, which implicitly posits a structural division between emotional and cognitive systems. Drawing on recent developments in computational neuroscience, particularly predictive coding, active inference, and constructionist theories of emotion, I argue that both emotional and cognitive functions emerge from a unified inferential system that minimizes prediction error across bodily and environmental domains. This view suggests that the functional duality observed in emotional and cognitive moral judgments does not necessarily imply a structural dualism in the brain’s computational system. Reframing moral judgment within a monolithic Bayesian framework dissolves traditional dichotomies such as reason versus emotion, and reconceives moral judgment as an embodied, context-sensitive process of predictive adaptation. This shift has significant implications for neuroethics and moral psychology, inviting a move beyond static dual process models toward a dynamic, integrative account of moral judgment.

This study analyzes contemporary discourses surrounding the search for the identity of Confucianism, which had formed the core of traditional educational systems, as it confronted the emergence of a modern educational system. Focusing on the early Meiji period, the paper explores the reception of Western philosophy, the modernization of Confucianism, and the formation of East Asian philosophy through the following three aspects: First, the University of Tokyo was established based on Western models, which forced Confucianism to redefine its purpose. As Japan's modernization was a state-centered reform, Confucianism was granted the status of an academic discipline under the assumption that it could contribute to cultivating the talent necessary for the formation of a nation-state. Second, in a modern system demanding scientific methodology, Confucianism had to transform into a modern academic discipline. In this context, Confucianism began to be associated with philosophy, while Western philosophy was translated into Confucian terminology. Third, intellectuals in East Asia viewed Western modernity as being built on the foundation of Western philosophy, and believed that East Asia needed its own philosophy for its modernization. This led to the creation of terms such as Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Korean philosophy, Japanese philosophy, and the broader term “Eastern philosophy.”

Since the late twentieth century, New Materialism has emerged as an influential current within Western philosophy. Discourse surrounding New Materialism, whether in support or critique, has primarily focused on its internal structures and commitments. I believe that complementing this inward-looking perspective with an outward-looking one can make the identity and significance of New Materialism clearer and more vivid. Against this backdrop, I aim to explore the identity and status of New Materialism by juxtaposing it with Correlationism, a paradigm that stands in stark opposition to it. My discussion will proceed perspectivally. First, I'll briefly survey how dichotomous or binary modes of thought such as subject-object, mind-matter, idealism-materialism, and epistemology- ontology have historically risen and fallen in Western philosophy, serving as the conceptual background for the contrast between Correlationism and New Materialism. Subsequently, I examine these two traditions in a comparative manner. In the history of Western thought since modernity, if Correlationism can be considered the thesis, then New Materialism is arguably the antithesis. This indicates a strong confrontational aspect between the two intellectual currents. In such a situation, there might be a tendency to choose one over the other. However, I propose the need to approach these two philosophical currents not as a matter of selective choice, but in terms of mutual complementation.