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Ambiguity of the Concept of Fact and the Identity Theory of Truth

  • PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE
  • 2025, (49), pp.45~68
  • Publisher : Research Institute for East-West Thought
  • Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities
  • Received : June 25, 2025
  • Accepted : September 29, 2025
  • Published : October 31, 2025

Kim Dong-hyun 1

1한국교통대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

The identity theory of truth clearly reveals the close connection between the world and truth, but at the same time it is theoretically instable in identifying between heterogeneous entities i.e. facts and propositions. Unlike the moderate identity theory that places facts in the realm of meaning, Trueman proposes an immodest identity theory that regards facts as states of affairs. While Trueman claims that his version of identity thesis is directly derived from the concepts of propositions and facts properly comprehended, Sullivan criticizes his theory for its ambiguity, especially in that it takes the concept of ‘world’ in two different meanings: ways things are and ways the world is thought to be. I will analyze that the ambiguity of the concept of ‘world’ in Trueman's theory stems from the dilemma that the identity theory innately faces. This dilemma is not limited to the immodest identity theory but is bound to occur throughout all kind of identity theory. Therefore, not only Truman's theory but also the identity theory in general can not be evaluated as a correct analysis of the truth.

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