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Deduction, Induction and Intention

  • PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE
  • 2020, (34), pp.239~263
  • DOI : 10.33639/ptc.2020..34.010
  • Publisher : Research Institute for East-West Thought
  • Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities
  • Received : October 25, 2020
  • Accepted : November 29, 2020
  • Published : November 30, 2020

LEE JINHEE 1

1아주대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

One of the main points of debate on the criteria for deductive and inductive distinctions is the realization criterion and the intention criterion. Hong and Yeo presented arguments supporting the intention criterion. Choi criticized their view and presented arguments in favor of the realization criterion. In this article, I will analyze their opinions and present a strategy to solve this problem. In particular, to solve this problem, we will have to focus on what I call the "expansion of intention." Based on these discussions, I will show that the intention criterion is adequate. In short, my argument is that if you allow the intention to intervene in defining 'argument', you should also accept that intentions intervene in classifying deductive and inductive. So my justification for the intention criterion is an indirect one.

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