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A Unified Bayesian Model of Moral Judgment-From Greene’s Dual-Process to Predictive Coding-

  • PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE
  • 2025, (48), pp.1~25
  • DOI : 10.33639/ptc.2025..48.001
  • Publisher : Research Institute for East-West Thought
  • Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities
  • Received : May 9, 2025
  • Accepted : May 18, 2025
  • Published : June 30, 2025

Jinyeong Gim 1

1서울대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

This paper offers a Bayesian critique of Joshua Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment, which implicitly posits a structural division between emotional and cognitive systems. Drawing on recent developments in computational neuroscience, particularly predictive coding, active inference, and constructionist theories of emotion, I argue that both emotional and cognitive functions emerge from a unified inferential system that minimizes prediction error across bodily and environmental domains. This view suggests that the functional duality observed in emotional and cognitive moral judgments does not necessarily imply a structural dualism in the brain’s computational system. Reframing moral judgment within a monolithic Bayesian framework dissolves traditional dichotomies such as reason versus emotion, and reconceives moral judgment as an embodied, context-sensitive process of predictive adaptation. This shift has significant implications for neuroethics and moral psychology, inviting a move beyond static dual process models toward a dynamic, integrative account of moral judgment.

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