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Incentive Design Considerations for Free-riding Prevention in Cooperative Distributed Systems

  • Journal of The Korea Society of Computer and Information
  • Abbr : JKSCI
  • 2011, 16(7), pp.137-148
  • Publisher : The Korean Society Of Computer And Information
  • Research Area : Engineering > Computer Science

신규용 1 유진철 1 이종덕 1 박병철 1

1육군사관학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

Different from the traditional client-server model, it is possible for participants in a cooperative distributed system to get quality services regardless of the number of participants in the system since they voluntarily pool or share their resources in order to achieve their common goal. However, some selfish participants try to avoid providing their resources while still enjoying the benefits offered by the system, which is termed free-riding. The results of free-riding in cooperative distributed systems lead to system collapse because the system capacity (per participant) decreases as the number of free-riders increases, widely known as the tragedy of commons. As a consequence, designing an efficient incentive mechanism to prevent free-riding is mandatory for a successful cooperative distributed system. Because of the importance of incentive mechanisms in cooperative distributed system, a myriad of incentives mechanisms have been proposed without a standard for performance evaluation. This paper draws general incentive design considerations which can be used as performance metrics through an extensive survey on this literature, providing future researchers with guidelines for the effective incentive design in cooperative distributed systems.

Citation status

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