[thesis]
강은봉
/ 2012
/ 규제개혁의 실효성 제고를 위한 법제 개선방안 연구
/ 박사
/ 동아대학교 대학원
[confproc]
경제민주화포럼
/ 2014
/
/ 진정한 규제개혁을 위한 규제개혁위원회 개혁방안 토론회 자료집
[journal]
권순만
/ 1995
/ 행정의 조직경제학적 접근: 대리인 이론의 행정학적 함의를 중심으로
/ 한국행정학보
29(1)
: 77~95
[journal]
김동연
/ 2014
/ 박근혜 정부의 규제개혁
/ 한국경제포럼
7(1)
: 53~75
[journal]
윤성식
/ 1993
/ 경제대리인이론과 조직의 효율성
/ 한국행정학보
27(2)
: 459~470
[report]
이주선
/ 2007
/ 규제개혁 추진체계 개선방안
/ 한국경제연구원
[report]
최병선
/ 2002
/ 규제개혁 추진체계의 개선방향
/ 전국경제인연합회
[confproc]
최유성
/ 2009
/ 한국 규제개혁의 회고와 전망
/ 한국정책학회 추계학술대회 발표논문
[journal]
Aghion, Philippe
/ 1997
/ Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
/ Journal of Political Economy
105
: 1~29
[journal]
Bawn, K
/ 1995
/ Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures
/ The American Political Review
89(1)
: 62~73
[journal]
Becker, G. S
/ 1983
/ A theory of compitition among pressure groups for political influence
/ The Quarterly Journal of Economics
98(3)
: 371~400
[journal]
Bendor, Jonathan
/ 2004
/ Spatial Models of Delegation
/ American Political Science Review
98
: 293~310
[journal]
Downs, G.W.
/ 1994
/ Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection:the Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War
/ American Journal of Political Science
38(2)
: 362~380
[thesis]
Feldmann, Sven E
/ 2005
/ Bureaucratic Expertise and Learning from Interest Groups
/ Northwestern University
[book]
Furubotn, E.
/ 2000
/ Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics
/ The University of Michigan Press
[thesis]
Gailmard, Sean
/ 2007
/ Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise
/ Northwestern University
[journal]
Holmstrom, B
/ 1979
/ Moral Hazard and Observability
/ Bell Journal of Economics
10(1)
: 74~91
[journal]
Horn, M.
/ 1989
/ Commentary on ‘Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies’: Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs
/ Virginia Law Review
2(75)
: 499~508
[journal]
Jensen
/ 1976
/ Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
/ Journal of Financial Economics
3
: 305~360
[book]
Laffont, J.J.
/ 2002
/ The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
/ Princeton University Press
[book]
Laffont, J.J
/ 1993
/ A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
/ The MIT Press
[journal]
McCubbins, Mathew D.
/ 1987
/ Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
/ Journal of Law, Economics, &Organization
3
: 243~277
[journal]
McCubbins, Mathew D.
/ 1989
/ Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies
/ Virginia Law Review
75
: 431~482
[journal]
Miller, G. J.
/ 1983
/ Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government
/ American Political Science Review
77
: 297~322
[confproc]
Mitnick B.N.
/ 1973
/ Fiduciary Rationality and Public Policy: The Theory of Agency and Some Consequences
/ paper presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Polictical Science Association
[book]
Mitnick, B.N
/ 1980
/ The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing and Removing Regulatory Forms
/ Columbia University Press
[journal]
Moe, Terry M
/ 1982
/ Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration
/ American Journal of Political Science
26(4)
: 197~224
[journal]
Moe, Terry M
/ 1984
/ The New Economics of Organization
/ American Journal of Political Science
28(4)
: 739~777
[journal]
Peltzman, S
/ 1976
/ Toward a More Ggeneral Theory of Regulation
/ Journal of Law and Economics
19(2)
: 211~240
[journal]
Persson, T.
/ 1997
/ Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
/ The Quarterly Journal of Economics
112(4)
: 1163~1202
[book]
Perrow, Charles
/ 1986
/ Complex Organization: A Critical Essay
/ Random House
[journal]
Scholz J.T.
/ 1986
/ Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System
/ American Political Science Review
80(4)
: 1249~1270
[journal]
Shepsle, K
/ 1992
/ Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey
/ Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
8
[journal]
Songer, D. R.
/ 1994
/ The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions
/ American Journal of Political Science
38(3)
: 673~696
[report]
Stephenson, Matthew C.
/ 2006
/ Bureaucratic Oversight and Endogenous Agency Expertise
/ John M. Olin Center, Harvard University
[journal]
Stephenson, Matthew C
/ 2006
/ Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise
/ Journal of Law, Economics & Organization
23(2)
: 469~498
[journal]
Stigler, G. J
/ 1971
/ The Theory of Economic Regulation
/ Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science
2(Spring)
: 3~21
[journal]
Szalay, Dezso
/ 2005
/ The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
/ Review of Economic Studies
72
: 1178~1198
[journal]
Wood D
/ 1991
/ The Dynimics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
/ The American Political Science Review
85(3)
: 801~823
[book]
Wood D
/ 1994
/ Bureaucratic Dynamic: the Role of Bureaucracy in a democracy
/ Westview Press