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The Idea of Phenomenology and Evidence in Husserl

  • Philosophical Investigation
  • 2006, 19(), pp.111~135
  • Publisher : Institute of philosophy in Chung-Ang Univ.
  • Research Area : Humanities > Philosophy

양영운 1

1중앙대학교

Candidate

ABSTRACT

The primary aim of this paper is to elucidate by means of intentional analysis of consciousness the concept "Evidence", which serves as a criterion of scientific cognition without which the Idea of Phenomenology would make no sense. Evidence as Husserl meant it is not simply what is shown by self-evident axioms or presuppositions. It rather involves what grounds the self-evidence. In this sense, it might be called "absolute evidence." And Husserl's attempt to establish Phenomenology as a rigorous science upon an absolutely evident basis would necessarily end in failure, without fruitful analysis and elucidation of experienced content and structure of consciousness from which Evidence is derived. That is, Husserl tried to realize the Idea of Phenomenology by securing Evidence of intentional experience through intuition of 'Sache Selbst' immediately given in consciousness, which is infallible. It follows that Husserl's Phenomenological Philosophy is an attempt to establish what conditions any philosophy which claims to be a science should satisfy in a phenomenologically rigorous way, to open up a sphere of transcendental consciousness which is essential to new transcendental philosophy based on Evidence secured by intentional analysis of consciousness, to make clear in a rigorous way what kind of science Philosophy in the proper sense of the term should be.

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