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Hume's Causation Conception and Scientific Explanation

  • Philosophical Investigation
  • 2006, 20(), pp.67~98
  • Publisher : Institute of philosophy in Chung-Ang Univ.
  • Research Area : Humanities > Philosophy

최현철 1

1호서대

Candidate

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is aimed at studying the relationships between Hume's causation conception and modern scientific explanation theory. For this object there are two interpretations regarding how developed critically modern scientific explanation theory based on classifying regular and necessary interpretation of philosophical positions surrounded by Hume's definition of causation. According to Hume, Constant conjunction by the causal conception C1 is the essential element of causation. Also the other definition of causation in Hume is construed as modal relationship following counter-factual condition between causation and resulting events. it is possible to have the basis of necessary interpretation so that causal conception C2, the analysis of counter-factual condition in causation. I investigated critically Hempel‘s explanation model on the strongly regular interpretation of causation. And I would like to debate that the criticism and anti-instance surrounding Hempel’s explanation model are all the same encountered with the limit of regular interpretation in causation. But One attempt to insure causal necessity that Lewis argued is counter-factual theory of causation. Lewis argued that explaining a certain event could provide an information with causal history having its information in causal explanation. But Lewis's causal theory drove the ship on the rocks encountering the problem of late preemption. In conclusion, I look out this thesis that the realistic explanation of causation make a sense for the being relevance of explanation.

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