The anomalous monism proposed by Donald Davidson is criticized that it will be implies mental epiphenomenalism. One way to get out of that difficulty is to explain the causal relation by replacing the strict law of Davidson by counterfactual conditionals. This paper tracks the definition to endow mental properties with causal power, and conclude that mental properties cannot have mental property in any definition.
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TY - JOUR AU - 최 훈 TI - Counteractuals Can't Help JO - Philosophical Investigation PY - 2004 VL - 16 IS - null PB - Institute of philosophy in Chung-Ang Univ. SP - 205 EP - 236 SN - 1598-7213 AB - The anomalous monism proposed by Donald Davidson is criticized that it will be implies mental epiphenomenalism. One way to get out of that difficulty is to explain the causal relation by replacing the strict law of Davidson by counterfactual conditionals. This paper tracks the definition to endow mental properties with causal power, and conclude that mental properties cannot have mental property in any definition. KW - counterfactual argument;mental causation;epiphenomenalism;familiarity DO - UR - ER -
