본문 바로가기
  • Home

Bayesian Prior Probability and Scientific Objectivity

Yeongseo Yeo 1

1동덕여자대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

Bayesian prior probability has been criticized for its being subjective. This criticism led to the conclusion that Bayesianism cannot be a scientific methodology. However, this paper claims that the object of the criticism is the absolute prior probability without any information, but not background knowledge relative prior probability. Background knowledge relative prior probability reflects the scientific theories at the time and scientists' experiences, thus making it sufficiently objective. Moreover, convergence theorem washes out the impact of the prior probabilities as more evidence comes in. Therefore, this paper concludes that the subjectivity charge on Bayesianism, especially on Bayesian prior probability, is ill founded.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.

This paper was written with support from the National Research Foundation of Korea.