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Husserl and Frege's Anti-psychologism

Young Woon Yang 1

1호서대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the criticisms levelled by G. Frege and E. Husserl against psychologism with special emphasis on clarifying in what respects their criticisms differ. Husserl and Frege got involved in the controversy over psychologism in the course of their attempts to lay a firm foundation for logic and mathematics. Though they were alike in firmly believing that there were some serious problems with psychologism, they did not agree in what those problems were. This disagreement made them take different steps in subsequently developing their respective philosophies. Frege, by removing every psychological elements and all kinds of psychological investigations from his philosophical study, could deal only with objective entities like what he called Thoughts[Gedanke]. In contrast, Husserl, despite his resolutely critical attitude toward psychologism, had no intention to drop his conviction of utility of psychological investigation and thus directed his attention toward consciousness of objects rather than objects themselves. As a result, from Husserl’s criticism of psychology grew his phenomenology as an epistemological theory or a transcendental philosophy which delves into the possibility of objective cognition, while Frege’s struggle with psychologism helped him create a new philosophical trend called ‘analytic philosophy’.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.