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Hume and the Morality of Sympathy

Maeng, Jooman 1

1중앙대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

I will scrutinize Hume’s moral emotionism in this paper. His main goal as an ethical naturalist is to discover reasons and origin of moral judgments in genetic viewpoint as not in normative one. At the same time, Hume thinks that moral judgments basically admit of universal viewpoint. Therefore it implies to have to show the universal viewpoint being valid in order to succeed in his ethical inquiry finding out principle of morality. Although Hume carried out this task through principle of sympathy in the A Treatise of Human Nature, and also in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals centered in humanity including benevolence, fellow-feelings as well. I claim that he didn't dissolve their having problems and limit. In some place of the latter recognized without making any adjustments what the universal feelings are, Hume said that “we must stop somewhere in our examination of causes; and there are, in every science, some general principles, beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general.” I infer from such a confession out of him that it is part of correspondence problems of impressions and ideas. And in line with these problems I think that Hume failed to show what moral judgments express an universal viewpoint in both of the A Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals in this paper. Finally I would argue that universal moral judgments require the third element besides sympathy and humanity.

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