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A Critique of Moore’s Proof of Outside World

Jechul BAK 1

1서울시립대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I have defended the phenomenalism, and criticized Moore’s argument of the existence of outside world. Phenomenalism is the philosophical position which claims that a statement claiming the existence of a physical object is semantically equals to the statements describing our senses. Thus, according to this perspective, our physical world can be a dream. In this paper I have defended this philosophical doctrine by providing a model, thus shown that this theory can not be easily refuted. This is the first purpose of this paper. The second purpose of this paper is to look at Moore's argument that can be understood as a critique of the phenomenalism, and to refute that argument. Moore tries to prove the existence of outside world. That is to say, he tries to refute the argument that we could be dreaming. I have pointed out the problems of a few conceptual devices that are mobilized for a Moore’s proof, and showed that his proof of the existence of outside world have serious problems. Conclusion is this: Moore was leaning on common sense, and his proof is not a rigorous demonstration. Therefore, the argument of Moore fails.

Citation status

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