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The Problem of Akrasia in light of Hume’s Theory of Sympathy —A Meta Ethical Approach—

Sunny Yang 1

1한국외국어대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

In this paper I defend the idea that akrasia can be rational if caused by emotion. Recently Nomi Arpaly (2003) argues that there are cases of so-called ‘inverse akrasia’, according to which the agent acts rationally and even morally but does so against his better judgment. In defense of this argument Arpaly and others (de Sousa 1987; McIntyre 1990; Jones 2003; Tappolet 2003) take the famous example of Huckleberry Finn. Following Arpaly and others, I take into account whether the inverse-akrasia is possible in Hume’s sympathy-based morality by utilizing Mark Twain’s character Huckleberry Finn. If the inverse-akrasia is possible in Hume’s sympathy-based morality, I argue that virtue is better than rules and principles.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.

This paper was written with support from the National Research Foundation of Korea.