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@article{ART002620672},
author={Jechul BAK},
title={Problem of Identity in Leibniz’s logical works},
journal={Philosophical Investigation},
issn={1598-7213},
year={2020},
volume={59},
pages={31-65},
doi={10.33156/philos.2020.59..002}

TY - JOUR
AU - Jechul BAK
TI - Problem of Identity in Leibniz’s logical works
JO - Philosophical Investigation
PY - 2020
VL - 59
IS - null
PB - Institute of philosophy in Chung-Ang Univ.
SP - 31
EP - 65
SN - 1598-7213
AB - Leibniz uses “the principle of salva veritate”(without changing the truth) for his logical work. According to this principle, the same thing can be replaced with each other without changing the truth value. For example, if the concept of “triangle” and the concept of “trilateral” are the same, replacing the concept of “triangle” with the concept of “trilateral” in all true propositions including the concept of “triangle” Trueness does not change. In order for the use of this principle to be justified, the concept of “triangle” and the concept of “trilateral” are identical to each other at the conceptual level, but there must be different points to be replaced. In the case of Frege, the verbal expressions of 'morning star' and 'evening star' have the same reference, but they differ in their meaning. Likewise, Leibniz has the same concept of “triangle” and “trilateral”, but there is something different to justify substitution. Leibniz claims that these two concepts have different implications(elemental concepts). “Triangle” has the implication of “trianglarity”, but “trilateral” does not. If these conditions are satisfied, the substitution is justified due to the differences in their implications. However, when looking at the logical writings of Leibniz, it is concluded that "triangle" and "trilateral" must share all implications(element concept). This conflicts with the claim that it has different implications. After all, the principle of “without changing the truth” cannot be justified in its use. The reason Leibniz faced this problem is that he does not grasp the Concept from our human point of view, but from God's point of view. Frege seems to solve the important point in the issue of identity, that of the same reference, and different meaning, by understanding the meaning from our human epistemological point of view. However, Leibniz faces difficulties by failing to do this consistently.
KW - Leibniz;Frege;Identity;Substitution;“the principle of salva veritate”(without changing the truth).
DO - 10.33156/philos.2020.59..002
ER -

Jechul BAK. (2020). Problem of Identity in Leibniz’s logical works. Philosophical Investigation, 59, 31-65.

Jechul BAK. 2020, "Problem of Identity in Leibniz’s logical works", Philosophical Investigation, vol.59, pp.31-65. Available from: doi:10.33156/philos.2020.59..002

Jechul BAK "Problem of Identity in Leibniz’s logical works" Philosophical Investigation 59 pp.31-65 (2020) : 31.

Jechul BAK. Problem of Identity in Leibniz’s logical works. 2020; 59 31-65. Available from: doi:10.33156/philos.2020.59..002

Jechul BAK. "Problem of Identity in Leibniz’s logical works" Philosophical Investigation 59(2020) : 31-65.doi: 10.33156/philos.2020.59..002

Jechul BAK. Problem of Identity in Leibniz’s logical works. Philosophical Investigation, 59, 31-65. doi: 10.33156/philos.2020.59..002

Jechul BAK. Problem of Identity in Leibniz’s logical works. Philosophical Investigation. 2020; 59 31-65. doi: 10.33156/philos.2020.59..002

Jechul BAK. Problem of Identity in Leibniz’s logical works. 2020; 59 31-65. Available from: doi:10.33156/philos.2020.59..002

Jechul BAK. "Problem of Identity in Leibniz’s logical works" Philosophical Investigation 59(2020) : 31-65.doi: 10.33156/philos.2020.59..002