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A study on the type and conformity of granting losing political parties power to govern - focus on the rule of government in opposition in the modern constitutional democracy-

  • DONG-A LAW REVIEW
  • 2019, (83), pp.1-31
  • DOI : 10.31839/DALR.2019.05.83.1
  • Publisher : The Institute for Legal Studies Dong-A University
  • Research Area : Social Science > Law
  • Received : April 15, 2019
  • Accepted : May 10, 2019
  • Published : May 31, 2019

CHO JAEHYUN 1

1동아대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

The idea about government of granting losing political parties the right not just to dissent from and obstruct the efforts of the winning political party, but also to exercise the power to govern as well, is an approach as a means of dividing power among political groups, what this Article calls “government in opposition”. Government in opposition rules a represent a distinctive approach to structuring the separation of powers in democratic system. Government in opposition rules exists for the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. In the legislative branch, losing political coalitions are sometimes given the power to chair standing or temporary committee, are given special powers on a committee even if they do not chair the committee. In several countries, losing political coalitions chair important legislative committee. In Korea, the forms of legislative government in opposition exist. Losing political coalitions also exercise winners’ power in the executive branch. Government in opposition rules also exists for the judical branch. Judical government in opposition rules extend not only to the appointment of individual to the courts but also to the operation of the courts. Government in opposition rules have normative benefits because they result in a more attractive role for losing political coalitions. It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented and losing political coalitions are represented in democratic institutions. Government in opposition rules would also create a more equitable distribution of political power, ensuring that political minorities, so even if government in opposition rules would be a welcome in our constitutional system, there are still some major issues of institutional design that need to be resolved. How mandatory are these rules and what is the exact amount of these rules present and so on. In conclusion, it is desirable that government in opposition rule should be implemented by an informal norm or a normal political process rather than statutory regulation or constitutional provision. And the power that would be available to losing coalition should be negotiated between losing political parties and winning political party in political process.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.

This paper was written with support from the National Research Foundation of Korea.