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Spinoza's theory of individual and the problem of freedom

  • 탈경계인문학Trans-Humanities
  • 2020, 13(1), pp.63-93
  • DOI : 10.22901/trans.2020.13.1.63
  • Publisher : Ewha Institute for the Humanities: EIH
  • Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities
  • Received : March 11, 2020
  • Accepted : April 22, 2020
  • Published : April 30, 2020

Hyouk Ju Lee 1

1인하대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

Spinoza defined freedom as a state of internal determination and constraint as a state of external determination. In this sense, only God has freedom, and all finite beings, including humans, are cognized to lack freedom because they cannot escape external determination. According to Spinoza, however, humans can be internally determined and can achieve freedom even though difficult and rare. This paper postulates that Spinoza’s view of the freedom of finite individuals can consistently be explained through his theory of individuals. Spinoza repudiated the freedom of finite individuals because human beings are fundamentally relational and cannot escape external determination. Conversely, the probable reason that Spinoza could recognize the possibility of human freedom was that he noted that external determination, which is a fundamental condition of existence and work of finite individuals, could be understood as a constant that may enable, rather than interfere with, the internal determination of finite individuals. However, we believed that the internal determination itself of finite individuals is just a necessary condition for freedom; it is not ‘true freedom.’

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This paper was written with support from the National Research Foundation of Korea.
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