2019, Vol., No.111

The Establishment Process of North Korea’s National Ministry of Defense and the Composition of it’s Organization

Kim, Seon-ho | 2019, (111) | pp.1~45 | number of Cited : 2

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The participation in the Korean War of Japanese Laborers and their repatriation in the US military Bases in Japan

Yang Yong-Jo | 2019, (111) | pp.47~88 | number of Cited : 3

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This study is about the participation and activity in the Korean War of Japanese Laborers in the US military Bases in Japan and repatriation after the war. When the US ground troops were decided to join, some of the Japanese laborers who had been employed at the US military bases moved to Korea with the US troops. Most of them volunteered for themselves went to the South Korea following the US troops by recommendation of the US troops' officials. These were not officially organized by the US forces but went to Korea for personal reasons. Strictly speaking, their move to the South Korea was illegal. These fact is confirmed in the public statement by General MacArthur that is impossible legally for the Japanese to join the United Nations' forces. Their motivations were analyzed as volunteering to supported US troops's, to earn money, to get a chance to go to America, or to vaguely get better opportunities. The number of laborers working at Japanese US military bases identified in the materials up to is 76. In each unit, 20 members in 24th division, 6 members in 25th division, 7 members in 1th cavalry division, 11 members in another units, and 10 members in unidentified unit were counted. However, it is assumed that there were many missing persons or deaths that were not included because they were often blocked or surrendered to the rear depending on the situation. Since the US troops did not record the loss report or obligation to the Japanese laborer at that time, no date has been confirmed so far. They carried out the combat service support under the strict control of the US military in the rear of the Korean front, as practiced at the US military bases in the Japan, and helped the US military in the role of helping, cooking, washing, technical support, driving, and interpreting. However, if the troops were in crisis or threatened by their own personal identifies, it is confirmed that they has also participated in the battle action with a pre-paid rifle. A Japanese laborer had been awarded Purple Hart Medal by the US government for the first time in seven months, killing at least 20 enemies on the front line and wounding. Their first existence was in December 1950 when the United Nations troops was at stake. In December 1950, the United Nations Command ordered that it should be reported immediately if there were Japanese Laborers in the United Nations ground troops. The measure of the United Nations command was based on the assumption that if the existence of Japanese Laborers was known to the Communist side, the United States would be stuck with international politics. The process of returning Japanese Laborers to Japan was also throughly managed by each Command or Unit. As a result, they returned to Japan in February 1951.

The Flexibility of Suwonbu(水原府) gunyeok(軍役) and implement of dongpoje(洞布制) in the late Joseon Dynasty

Im SeongSoo | 2019, (111) | pp.89~129 | number of Cited : 1

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Suwonbu was the biggest town in Gyeonggi area around the doseong and strategic point located on the way(大路) to Seoul in Samnam. After the 17th century, Gunchong(軍總) was increased so much as the military importance of Suwonbu was weighed on. In comparison with Gunyeok resources, which means, the military service manpower, there were lots of Gunchong and Cheopyeok(疊役) became the biggest problems in Gunyeok management. After Suwonbu was changed into Hwaseong in the late 18th century, a part of military amount was reduced and opposing amount was also reduced by the order of Jeongjo, but fundamental problem of excessive Gunchong of Suwonbu had not been solved. After Jangyongyeong was broken, the supports of soldiers and finance were stopped around there and it was more difficult to manage Gunyeok of Suwonbu. The problems of Gunyeok that had been accumulated for a long time were shown by various aspects in the whole 19th century. As a part of rich classes was out of the Gunyeok burden by offering bribe, the pain of remained poor people, was increased. Therefore, Dongpoje started to be fulfilled generally by the order of Heungseondaewongun in the 6th year of Gojong(1869). Dongpoje was the method to reduce the burden of people while maintaining existing Gunchong and letting Yangban who are noble class and rich classes who were excluded from Gunyeok pay Gunpo. Dongpoje was fulfilled by the method to evenly oppose Gunchong arranged to Suwonbu to hochong investigated newly. Also, while responsibilities in Gunpo collection were given to each unit of town, it’s promoted to collect Dongpo stably. In the other hand, autonomous management of town unit was guaranteed and communal cooperation was induced. In the area where Dongpoje was fulfilled, Yangban classesㆍrich classes, and general people were cooperative and stable Gunyeok could be managed by unit of town. Those results are judged to a decisive opportunity to expand the management of Dongpoje nationally by the court, fulfill Hopoje.

The Status of Defense at the Initial Period of Imjin-War(壬辰倭亂) and the Seongju (星州) Combat

Kim Jong Soo | 2019, (111) | pp.131~161 | number of Cited : 2

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As Chosun was a country founded with the military coup caused by Wihwado(威化島) Retreat as a chance, the kings of the country throughout the history were quite sensitive about the employment of the military. Particularly, Taejong(太宗) regarded military power as the source of authority and abolished the private miliary system but established the public one in order to make the king’s monopoly of the military power firmly, and he also abolished the private relations between the general and soldiers. Later, Chosun government divided the military organization into peace and war footings and did not allow the commander of the peace footing to lead the military that he had selected and trained himself during the war and allowed the commander appointed additionally by the center to command the military. Concerning the defense system at the initial period of Imjin-war, Jeolla-do(全羅道) and Gyeongsangwu-do(慶尙右道) dealt with it quite differently. Jeolla coped with the wartime situations while maintaining the peace footing. Originally, the commander of the peace footing was not allowed to lead the military under his command during the war. In the urgent situation, however, as the government did not send the commander of the war footing, Jeolla’s governor, the commander of the peace footing, did command and control the troops and soldiers. In Gyeongsangwu-do, however, as both peace and war footings collapsed at the early period of Imjinwaeran, sajok(士族) from all different places became the forces leader and collected the scattered soldiers to go out to drive away the Japanese invaders. Yet, that forces organization was similar to that of the war footing. About the Seongju(星州) Combat, it has been known that it took place three times, but according to 『Nanjungjaprok(亂中雜錄)』, those three times were not all. To recover Seongju Seong(星州城), either large or small combats had developed up to 18 times. In the meantime, a lot of righteous armies were sacrificed. The righteous armies’ activity was even more noticeable in Gyeongsangwu-do than in Jeolla-do. As one of the reasons for that, we can point out the fact that peace and war footings both collapsed in Gyeongsang and also solidarity among sajok(士族) and their control over the people were stronger there than in Jeolla.

The time of construction and nature of the valley encircling fortresses, called as ‘Pogoksic’ one, on the flatland sites in the East Coast of Gangwon-do

youngho hong | 2019, (111) | pp.163~215 | number of Cited : 2

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In the East Coast of Gangwon-do, there are valley encircling fortresses on the flatland sites that taken advantage of the natural mountain ridges as ramparts. Mostly the geographical features of mountains (north high and south low), and the east, southeast and south of the mountain fortresses lead to flatland, they had served as the entrance. And there used to be a river flowing in front and a farmland. Based on the folk materials regarding these mountain fortress, which have been handed down to us, many believe that they were constructed in the age of Yeguk (the Iron Age), the age of Three Kingdoms and the Unified Shilla period. But the researcher classified these types of mountain fortresses, and analyzed archeological materials and folk materials, and came to the conclusion that these mountain fortress cannot date back to the age of Yeguk (the Iron Age) and the age of Three Kingdoms. The researcher believes that only very few of these mountain fortresses were utilized in the Unified Shilla period, and most mountain fortresses were constructed and utilizeed during the Goryo Dynasty, and many of them were built and used at the end of the Goryo Dynasty and in the early Joseon Dynasty period. In this respect, caution must be exercised when these fortresses are used as base data for historical interpretation. The nature of these fortresses varies depending on their sizes, but as the mountain fortresses have a wells, people could live and seek protection in them, and as there are roof tiles, these mountain fortress may be related to the ruling class. In some mountain fortress, roof tiles bearing the name of the ‘official residence’ were excavated, and as the origins of names of places like ‘Jangan (seong),’ ‘Manho’ and ‘Jinjang’ have been handed down to us, they may be related to Chiso-seong (eup-seong and hyeon-seong), but most of them were controlled by them, or they can be seen as the administrative and military strongholds (villages) of local indigenous forces in charge of managing these fortresses. Furthermore, as some fortresses are located on the seashore, they are seen to have plated the role of non-regular marine transportation and ocean transportation bases on the East Coast, and the reason that these fortresses have a river flowing nearby may be related to transportation of goods.

The Reform of India’s Defense System: Lessons Learned from the Several Wars recently

Sohn, Hanbyeol | 2019, (111) | pp.217~258 | number of Cited : 1

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This article deals with the history of India's defense reform. Particularly on a military level, India has gained momentum for reform as it has experienced several wars. Regardless of whether the war itself ended in success or failure, India has maintained its direction of reform through lessons learned from these wars. This study focuses on the reports and actual application of the Defense Reform Committees, which were organized right after the war between India and China in 1962, the end of the Cold War in 1990, the Kargil War against neighboring Pakistan in 1999, and the multiple terror attacks in the 2000s. Based on this, it analyzes the Indian defense reform’s characteristics such as self-reflection and setting the direction of development, formation of a grand strategy, reorganization of the upper command structure, and maintenance of military balance with neighboring countries. The implications of this article are as follows: First, a lesson learned must be drawn from any success or failure to establish a clear direction, and then actively pursue it. Second, in order to adapt to changes in strategic environments, procedures for military strategy planning must be established, and above all, it begins with threat and risk assessment. The planned strategy also needs to be open to Congress and the people at the right level to form a consensus and unite the national power in one direction. Third, at a military level, the military should seek integration of the military while preparing institutional framework for a faithful military advice on civilian officials. Finally, the government needs a financial foundation to secure critical military power so that it can respond to any threat. Given that defense reform is aimed at achieving the national security objective in an effective and efficient manner, its importance is emphasized even more today.

The Implication of the Roman Siege Warfare from the Tactical Point of View in the Gallic Wars

Bae Eun Suk | 2019, (111) | pp.259~290 | number of Cited : 1

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The purpose of this study is to grasp the historical meaning of tactics by analyzing the cases of Caesar 's siege in the Gallic Wars. In the case of the Battle of Avaricum and Uxcellodunum, Caesar had carried out a general operation of moving soldiers on a protective transport route, and destroying enemy walls by mounting a siege tower, a battering ram, and a ballista. The uniqueness of Caesar's tactic was to mount the embankment and siege tower as close as possible to the enemy's wall. The reason is that the walls of Gaul were filled with rocks and timbers and they were able to withstand fire or wave attacks. Another reason is that the Gallic tribes were embarrassed by the unfamiliarity of the siege of the Roman army in the early stages of the war, but as the war proceeded, they responded in Roman style by imitating the Roman way. In the battle of Alesia, Caesar used the past siege tactics of fencing with moats and piles. He blocked the enemy's entry with a device like a moat, a V-shaped pit, and a pile. In addition, Caesar had built up a circumvallation that monitors Alesia residents and a contravallation that blocks the possibility of an attack behind. The so-called ‘bicircumvallation’ was constructed. This was also a device that the Roman army had used before. However, it made the length longer and blocked the possibility of external and internal attacks. This sophisticated encirclement was built because of the possibility of the emergence of the armed forces, and because of the improved tactical capacity of the Gallic tribes. In the case of the siege of the Gallic Wars, Caesar did not invent new siege machines or develop new siege warfare tactics. However, he improved the existing siege machine and siege warfare tactics to suit the enemy situation, thereby improving the combat power of the Roman army. He had increased the practical aspect of tactics. Therefore, the Gallic Wars could be seen as an opportunity to develop siege tactics in both Rome and Gallia.

North Korean History and North Korean-Soviet Relations with a New Seeing

Jaehoon Lee | 2019, (111) | pp.291~304 | number of Cited : 3

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2019, Vol., No.111