KJCKorea
Journal Central

Focusing on the military-bureaucracy-civilian roundtable talks (jwadamhoe) planned and organized by the Ministry of National Defense’s Troop Information and Education (TI&E) Bureau during the Korean War, this study examines the Korean War as a total war and investigates the logic of mobilizing home-front civilians alongside its narrative construction. To this end, it analyzes Kukbang (National Defense), the official organ of the TI&E Bureau. This narrative of self-mobilization was most concretely materialized in the gendered representation of home-front women. Maternal devotion, a wife’s domestic support (naejo), and comforting letters from female students were codified into gendered modalities of mobilization. Conversely, direct critique of the military and male authority was suppressed, while the structural violence of the home front was reduced to and concealed as individual “deviance.” In sum, the TI&E Bureau’s military-bureaucracy-civilian roundtables functioned as a discursive apparatus that formalized the logic of wartime home-front support into a structure of “self-mobilization.” This demonstrates that total war during the Korean War bound the home front to the war effort through discursive mechanisms just as decisively as through physical mobilization.

The purpose of this study is to understand the operational art and combat execution of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) during the initial phase of the Korean War. To achieve this, the study examines Stalin’s war plan and Vasilyev’s campaign plan, while analyzing the underlying Soviet theories of operational art, as well as the lessons learned from Soviet experiences in World War Ⅱ. Stalin initially opposed the war due to concerns over a protracted war of attrition in the event of U.S. intervention and issues regarding the permanent operating factors. However, considering the possibility of China’s intervention on the Korean Peninsula, he approved a three-stage war plan. Stalin prioritized political justification over surprise, envisioned a protracted war of attrition involving Chinese forces, and explicitly limited direct Soviet military intervention. Vasilyev’s campaign plan placed the highest priority on the first stage: neutralizing the main forces of the South Korean military north of Suwon through simultaneous multi-front pressure and flanking envelopment maneuvers. The second stage envisioned deep maneuver warfare led by mechanized units, followed by the mopping up of remnants in the third stage. However, the plan overlooked logistics and troop replenishment issues. The NKPA’s defeat in the decisive early battles of the first stage was the product of their operational immaturity and the leadership’s fear and confusion regarding potential defeat. This was further compounded by the tactical incompetence and errors of certain divisions. Notably, the operational halt in Seoul was not caused by the need for operational preparations (such as engineering equipment readiness or rest) or expectations of a popular uprising. Rather, it stemmed from the fear and confusion triggered by the rapid intervention of U.S. forces, combined with Kim Il-sung’s operational immaturity. Although the confusion within the North Korean leadership was temporarily stabilized by Stalin’s orders and the operational art framework was reorganized with the support of Soviet advisors, The NKPA ultimately lost its operational momentum. The loss of air superiority hindered deep maneuver warfare, and severe limitations in wartime sustainability and troop replenishment hampered its capabilities. The primary obstacles were Stalin’s restrictions on deploying Soviet airpower and the limited role permitted to Soviet military advisors. By around August 20, prior to the September Offensive, the NKPA had reached its operational culminating point. However, prompted by a reassuring letter from Stalin on August 28, they continued their offensive, failing to accurately judge the critical turning point for strategic withdrawal or defense. Furthermore, their failure to comply with the order to assemble for the defense of Seoul ultimately exacerbated the catastrophic losses of the North Korean forces.

This study examines the relationship between the transformation of North Korea’s Military Command and Control System following Kim Il Sung’s establishment of the Supreme Headquarters and assumption of the position of Supreme Commander after the outbreak of the Korean War, and the Korean People’s Army’s (KPA) failure to prevent the United Nations’ Incheon Landing Operation, culminating in the operational culmination of the KPA offensive along the Nakdong River line. Previous studies have primarily focused on the organizational structure, institutional status, and functions of North Korea’s Military Command and Control System. Building upon these studies, this research examines how changes in the command system influenced the conduct of military operations before and after the Incheon Landing Operation, thereby providing a new operational perspective on North Korea’s wartime command structure. At the outbreak of the Korean War, North Korea entered the conflict under a peacetime command system based on collective leadership. Recognizing the need for centralized wartime command, Kim Il Sung established the Military Commission and subsequently, with the support of the Soviet Military Advisory Group, created the Supreme Headquarters and assumed the position of Supreme Commander. Although this transformation centralized command authority, the KPA failed to prevent the Incheon Landing Operation, reached its operational culmination along the Nakdong River line, and ultimately retreated north of the 38th Parallel. These military setbacks exposed the limitations of the newly established command system and prompted the recognition of the need for a new military control system.