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The Gyojeong Dogam, established by Choe Chung-heon, continued to exist until the fall of the military regime in 1270. For more than half a century, the Gyojeong Dogam is generally known to have been the most powerful governing institution, supporting the authority of the supreme military ruler. Therefore, in understanding the military regime, the Gyojeong Dogam occupies a significant position, and its historical significance cannot be overlooked. However, although numerous scholarly achievements have accumulated regarding the Gyojeong Dogam, various interpretations and debates have continued in many respects up to the present. Accordingly, the author begins by examining the time of the establishment of the Gyojeong Dogam, which may be regarded as the starting point among the issues that have long been subjects of debate. Based on a reconsideration centered on examples of ‘dogam’ established during the period of Choe Chung-heon regime, the author proposes - contrary to previous views - that the Gyojeong Dogam was established in the first month of 1206(the second year of King Huijong’s reign). Meanwhile, it is argued that the members of the Gyojeong Dogam during the period of Choe Chung-heon regime consisted of high-ranking officials such as jaechu and seungseon, as well as officials from the Ministry of Personnel Affairs and the Ministry of Military Affairs, who concurrently held these posts. Representative figures include No Gwan, Geum Ui, Choe Seon, and Gi Hong-su. It was also confirmed that the Gyojeong Dogam had functions beyond overseeing criminal cases and monitoring government misconduct, including supervising the civil service examination, managing personnel administration, and holding meetings on major state affairs that required the mobilization of official military forces. These functions are believed to have been transferred from the Dobyoungmasa and the Ministry of Personnel Affairs and Ministry of Military Affairs, via the Council of Generals, to the Gyojeong Dogam. Considering the above, the historical significance of the establishment of the Gyojeong Dogam can be understood as Choe Chung-heon’s effort, after several years of preparation, to control the newly enthroned King Huijong and to firmly consolidate the political and military foundation of the Choe regime. Moreover, considering the characteristics of its members and the process through which its functions were transferred, the Gyojeong Dogam likely also served to lend official legitimacy and authority to the decisions made by Choe Chung-heon.

This article reexamines, from a military-historical perspective, why government forces failed to suppress the Hong Gyeong-nae Rebellion quickly in its initial stage in 1811. While previous studies have focused mainly on the social and political background of the revolt and the character of its leadership, this study analyzes the structural causes of early failure by examining the command system of Pyeongan Province and the military responses of individual districts. In late Joseon, Pyeongan Province operated a decentralized defense system centered on independent garrisons (dokjin). This system worked well against external invasions when danger was recognized in advance, but revealed serious limits when faced with a sudden internal uprising. The rapid collapse of government forces north of the Cheongcheon River resulted largely from weak information sharing and lack of mutual support among districts. By comparing the cases of Gasan, Kwaksan, Jeongju, Seoncheon, Cheolsan, and Yongcheon, this study evaluates responses using five criteria: early detection, decisions of magistrates, troop mobilization, internal collaboration, and outcomes. The initial failures were caused not by individual incompetence but by structural constraints, unreliable intelligence, limits on mobilization, and collaborators. Anju, the provincial headquarters, functioned as an information hub. Using reliable intelligence, it avoided exaggerated rebel proclamations and gradually concentrated troops. Together with successful defenses in Yeongbyeon and Guseong, this allowed provincial forces to gain the upper hand before central troops arrived and force the rebels into Jeongju Fortress.

By April 1950, the North Korean Air Force(NKAF) had completed ground-based theoretical training and combat preparations, and deployed the largest number of troops to the training regiment to rapidly enhance its combat power. Flight students from the Training Regiment, under the direct control of the Ministry of National Defense, acquired independent flight capabilities through intensive flight training with the Yak-18 aircraft in January and February 1950. The Fighter Regiment and Fighter-bombers Regiment began full-scale flight training in 1949, and in 1950, in preparation for war, they doubled their flight training hours compared to 1949. Beginning in April 1950, the Air Division’s Fighter-bombers Regiment intensively trained Ilyushin(IL) aircraft in preparation for war. However, until 1950, the Fighter bombers R egim ent only conducted ground to ground gunfire and dive bombing training, and did not conduct any training necessary for air combat. While the pilots of the Fighter Regiment acquired the ability to fly solo and in formations with two aircraft through flight training by February 1950, they all received their first ground-to-ground and air-to-air gunfire training in May. As a result, the Flight Division’s combat flight capabilities remained inadequate even in 1950. With offensive warfare in mind, the NKAF began training its pilots in Yak-9 fighters and IL-10 fighter-bombers in March 1950, acquiring combat flight and attack capabilities that could be utilized in actual combat. However, the NKAF pilots first received training in group flight, shooting, and bombing techniques essential for offensive warfare, as well as joint operations, in March and April 1950. Ultimately, the NKAF was deployed to the Korean War without sufficient mastery of the attack techniques, air combat flight techniques, and joint operations capabilities essential for all-out war.