KJCKorea
Journal Central

This study analyzes the armistice plans conceived by the United States at the conclusion of the Korean War, identifies the primary targets for deterrence, and examines the roles expected of the South Korean military in this context. The Chinese forces initially inflicted heavy losses on U.S. troops and increased their military efficiency during the armistice negotiations. As the Eisenhower administration resumed armistice talks with the Communist side, it suspended its previously planned expansionist war policy (NSC 147) and, through NSC 154/1, devised an armistice plan targeting China. Later, in the Geneva political negotiations, the U.S. considered NSC 157, which aimed for a neutralized reunification plan for Korea, but ultimately recognized its impracticality. In this approach, the U.S. identified China as the main counterpart in negotiations and as the primary target for deterrence. The U.S. government ultimately pursued NSC 170/1, which comprehensively considered both long-term and realistic objectives. Depending on the various armistice plans, the U.S. held different expectations for the role of the South Korean military. However, after finalizing NSC 170/1, the U.S. regarded the South Korean military as a force to conduct ground operations against Communist forces, primarily composed of Chinese troops, in cooperation with U.S. forces. Pursuing NSC 170/1, the U.S. decided that if Chinese forces disrupted the armistice order, it would conduct ground, naval, and air operations on the Korean Peninsula and strike targets in mainland China and Manchuria with nuclear weapons. This approach also aligned with the economic priorities outlined in NSC 162/2.

This study aims to analyze the interrogators and how the information gathered by them was used in the interrogation of Chinese POWs during the Korean War. These interrogators can be divided into four main categories. They include US Far East Air Force agents, ATIS(Allied Translator & Interprter Section) agents, South Korean agents, and military intelligence Services agents. ATIS agents make up the majority of these, and most of them are Japanese-American second generation (Nisei). With the outbreak of the Korean War, ATIS rapidly reorganized the ATIS Frontline Unit (ADVATIS) on July 7, 1950, to be deployed to the Korean front. ADVATIS was responsible for interrogating North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war, sorting, organizing, and translating North Korean captured documents sent by each detachment and division, categorizing them into strategic and tactical information, and transferring them to ATIS headquarters in Tokyo. ADVATIS's work was enormous. As of December 2, 1950, it had conducted the initial screening of 95,000 POWs, interrogated 1,760 of them, and prepared 2,788 interrogation reports. In addition, it had organized, evaluated, and translated 18 tons of captured documents. In addition to POW interrogation, ATIS began to systematically translate documents seized or captured from the Chinese military. The Enemy Documents series is a representative example. The information was also categorized and organized into Tactical Intelligence and Geographic Intelligence. In the end, most of the POW communications on the North Korean Army and the Chinese Communist Army were produced by Nisei, which made an important contribution to the conduct of the war by providing the UN forces with vital information on the North Korean Army and the Chinese Communist Army's battle order, command system, and means of combat that combat units needed.

According to the maps of the late Joseon Dynasty, 『Dongyeodo(東輿圖)』, 『Daedongyeojido(大東輿地圖)』, and 『Daedongbangyeojedo(大東方輿全圖)』, Seongju(成州) Kiamseong (岐巖城) was a stone castle located on the left side of Dumi Mountain(頭尾山) in Samgi-myeon(三岐面: now Samdeokmyeon( 三德面), Seongcheon-gun(成川郡), Pyeongannamdo, North Korea). The Battle against Mongol army took place in January 1259 (the 46th year of King Gojong’s reign), and the troop of Yabyeolcho(夜別抄) and Seongju people cooperated with each other to defeat a Mongol army unit that is believed to have been led by a Mongol general, Bopadae(甫波大). The Battle of Kiamseong was the last victory of Goryeo in Bukkye (北界) at the end of the 6th invasion of Mongolia (1254-1259) and the only victory of the military, government, and people in cooperation. A unit of Yabyeolcho was already dispatched to Kiamseong in 1258, and Jiyu(指諭) of Yabyeolcho, who is believed to have acted as a Banghobyulgam(防護別監), commanded the soldiers of Yabyeolcho(about 200 soldiers) and the people of Seongju to repel the Mongol cavalry. The main reason for the victory of the Battle of Kiamseong was that the Kiamseong Fortress was surrounded by the Biryu River(沸流江) and Gijanghucheon River and was located in a relatively rugged mountainous area, which was advantageous for defending the enemy, that Yabyeolcho, the best military force of Goryeo, was involved in the battle, and that the castle residents’ fighting capabilities, which had never been invaded by Mongol forces until the 5th invasion of Mongol, were maintained until 1259. As a result of the victory of this battle, the Mongol army stationed in Bukkye no longer attacked various fortresses in the Northern Territories of Goryeo, and the the peace negotiations between Goryeo and Mongol on the condition of Taejachinjo(太子親朝) were accelerated, eventually contributing to the conclusion of the peace negotiations toward Mongol in April 1259.