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This paper was written to analyze the tenure of Hasamdo soldiers in the early Joseon Dynasty, and to understand how the soldiers actually operated. The main historical materials referred to in the study were the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty, with various eupji’s “Siran” used in addition to these records. The scope of the study ranges from the founding of the Joseon Dynasty to 1592, when the Japanese Invasion of Korea broke out. A total of 395 soldiers were appointed to Hasamdo In the early Joseon Dynasty. Amongthem, just 31soldiers, or 8percent, worked in the same province continuously, as assigning one soldier to a specific region for a long time was considered to create the risk of them claiming their own private landorus urping military authority. While the statutory guaranteed term of service for soldiers was two years, or 24 months, our analysis found that the average term was only half this duration, or 12 months. Terms were shortened due to failure of an operation, personal circumstances or corruption of the soldier. In the early Joseon Dynasty, there were a total of 52 families, and 120 families produced Hasamdo Island. The families that produced more than two of them were 29 families and 55 families of 55 families. Looking at the characteristics of the families that produced Hasamdo soldiers, unlike the late Joseon Dynasty, those who served as soldiers are intertwined with blood relations. Because soldiers are external workers, the main epithelium was also applied to the epithelium system. Therefore, when we look at the home towns and places of appointment of those who were appointed as soldiers, Seoul and Gyeonggi-do were generally some what dominant. By period, more people from their hometowns were appointed in the 15th century, but this decreased in the 16th century. At the time of his appointment as a soldier, the official goods were mainly composed of second-class gaseon godfathers, followed by third-class Dang Sanggwan was appointed. In addition, more than a family loan was appointed, but the ratio was only 12%. By age, the largest demographic groups were soldiers appointed in their 40s and 50s, followed by those in their 60s and 30s.

By the late Joseon Dynasty, Chungcheon Suyeong Fortress had jurisdictionoverthepolicyforpinetrees(松政)onAnmyeondoIsland. Thepolicyforpinetreeswasaforestpolicyforprocuringpinetrees for timber (船材), construction materials (建築用材), and inner and outer coffins (棺槨用). The pine trees from Anmyeondo Island were renowned, as they became known by the common nouns ‘島松’ (Pine Trees in the Island) or ‘安眠松’ (Pine trees in Anmyeon Island) and had been protected, being used as timber and construction materials of the royal court even in the Goryeo Dynasty. 71 places were designated as Bongsan (封山) in Anmyeondo Island in the Joseon Dynasty, and these were collectively called ‘the pine forest in Anmyeondo Island (松田),’ which accounted for 80% of the area of the island. Chungcheon Suyeong Fortress took full charge of the managementofpinetreesintheislandbeginningin1669(10thyear of the reign of Hyeonjong of Joseon). As the military organization called Chungcheon Suyeong Fortress operated the forest, there was efficiency and consistency in its management. Yet, as it ignored residents' living convenience by focusing on an oppressive ban on pine trees (松禁) like military operations, it caused resistance from the people and became divorced from their needs. As Chungcheon Suyeong Fortress implemented the policy related to pinetrees in Anmyeondo Island for more than 220years, it supplied construction materials for Gyeonggisuyeong Fortress and the palace as well as the timber required for it, as well as some timber for shipbuilding (漕船) and armed ships (軍船) in Jeolla-do. However, as it ignored the need to plant and grow trees, the essence of the management of pinetrees, by the 19th century, Suyeong government officials' greed and tyranny deepened. Devastation of the pine forest worsened, but the governmental forest policy kept the ban on pinetrees (松禁) from being improved. ChungcheonSuyeong Fortress' policy on pinetrees was a special case which was implemented on an island called Anmyeondo Island. The need for research was raised as the subject suitable for examining the real condition of the policy for pinetrees. Accordingly, we examined the procurement of pine trees in Anmyeon Island, the acquisition of finances, and the problems through ChungcheonSuyeong Fortress' policy for pine trees implemented in Anmyeondo Island.

This study conducted an in-depth comparative analysis of the government troops’ military operation to suppress the First Hongju Righteous Army led by CheongInhee, known as the Battle of Jeongsan. Previous academic studies have not addressed the situations faced by both the vanguard leader CheongInhee and the government troops; therefore, this study conducted a literature analysis and field work. The governor of Cheongyang-gun, CheongInhee, became the leader of the army’s vanguard on January 18, 1896 and formed an army of 2,000 righteous soldiers. Then, CheongInhee attacked Gongju-bu, which was within a 41km distance. The Confucian scholars, including chief advisor Lee Se Young, had assisted under his command and the Station Staff of the Geumjeong Public stage station were key members of the righteous army. However, it was found that they did not have sufficient equipment for the rugged environment and badweather.They had marched for 18.6 km and stayed at Jeongsan for 3 days. At that time, 50 soldiers in the platoon of Koo Wanhee, among the 100 Gongju-bu government troops, were hidden in ambush at Gongsuwon at the border between Jeongsan and Gongju, and 50 soldiers in the platoon of Paik Rak-Wan defended at the back. The advance party of the righteous army that resumed their advance in the evening ofJanuary 21 was ambushed by the government troop’s feint strategy when they reached Gongsuwon and the late-arriving group ran away, at which point they were defeated. The main reason for the defeat was that the government troop, despite being smaller in size, had stronger firepower and their strategy was in a superior position. In academia, Cheolmajeong has been known as the Jeongsan battle area; however, it was confirmed that Jeongsan-gun Gongsuwon (currently Songam-ri, Mok-myeon, Cheongyang-gun) was the Jeongsan battle area. After the defeat, Cheong Inhee was dismissed from the position of governor, and left the Chungnam area. Others, including Lee Se Young who had served under Cheong Inhee, initiated the Second Hongju righteous army rebellion in 1906 following the failed experience of joining the war. Through a comparative analysis of the strategies employed by the government troops and the early Righteous Army, this study isexpectedtocontributetoacademicresearchinmilitaryandhistory, as well as studies on regional history.