2021, Vol., No.118

A Study on the Process of Development for Co-operation Between the Western UN Naval Forces and the Anti-Communist Commando Unit in the Korean War

Inseung Kim | 2021, (118) | pp.1~43 | number of Cited : 2

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The battle of ‘Chiljung’ Fortress and ‘Maeso’ Fortress in the Period of the War between Silla and T'ang dynasty

Kim, Byoung-hee , Seo Young Kyo | 2021, (118) | pp.45~95 | number of Cited : 9

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The battle of ‘Maeso’ Fortress has been paid attention in the study about during the Period of the War between Silla and T’ang dynasty in middle of 7th century. According to the Chinese records about the situation before the battle, it was mentioned that T'ang forces under the command of general Liu Rengui(劉仁軌) crossed the Limjin river, defeated the troops of Silla, and occupied the ‘Chiljung' Fortress. Also it was recorded that the troops of Malgal which was one of the tribe of the North-Western region of T’ang, advanced southward by ships. In other words, T’ang and Malgal were not separated troops that operated independently in the context of strategy, but a allied forces that advanced along both sides sea and land. As in the 『New Book of T'ang(新唐書)』, it is reasonable to assume that T’ang attacked the northern boundary of Silla. Therefore, it was so risky to carry out a operation under the condition of the limitation that Tang’s supply ship could advanced too far to east. It meaned that they had to take risk of run out of supplies. So then, the final landing place had to be as possible as close in with the ‘Chiljung’ Fortress. As the result, the landing place of Malgal had to be the place that a ship could enter, and It should be somewhere between the mouth of Limjin river and Gorangpo. The author pays attention to U-po, also called the castle site of Geumpa-ri. It is reasonable to assume the place was the place to load and keep combat strength and supplies, and the rear base for advancing to the Chiljung-seong Fortress. It is estimated that ‘Maeso’ Fortress was located in Yeoncheon or Yangju. If this fortress was located in Yeoncheon, it could be difficult to understand why the allied forces pulled out from the ‘Maeso’ Fortress and then marched to the ‘Chiljung’ Fortress in south. In other words, if the fortress was located in Yangju, it could be easy to understand the situations of battles that had happened while the allied forces was pulling out. Because it is possible to suppose the routes of retreat from various angles. This is the reason why the allied forces that advanced from north to south occupied the ‘Chiljung’ Fortress at first. A role of the ‘Chiljung’ Fortress is that it is easy to defend the uphill path of Seolma-ri that connected to a main road headed for Yangju and Han river.

The Features of the war between Wiman Chosun and Chinese Han Dynasty

WonChin Cho | 2021, (118) | pp.97~137 | number of Cited : 8

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This study investigates the causes and aspects of the war between Wiman Chosun (衛滿朝鮮) and Han (漢). The major cause of the war was that Shehe (涉何) of Han murdered Biwang of Gochosun, which was the firstly established country in the Korean peninsula. Wiman Chosun could not but choose the war as a result of this provocation of Han, which led to the attack of Wiman Chosun on Liaodong Eastern Section. The location of Liadong Eastern Section to which Shehe was appointed is possibly the region of Houcheng-xian (候城縣), which became Liadong Central Section after the fall of Wiman Chosun. If we conjecture the scale and advance route of Han's armies, it does not seem probable that the navy of Han dynasty attacked Wiman Chosun via the trans-central West Sea route. Therefore, it is construed as proper that Han sent its navy via the northern West Sea coastal route and dispatched its army composed of 50,000 soldiers towards Liadong. Wiman Chosun had already captured an advantageous position to the west of Paesu (浿水) river, and so was able to prevent the joining of Han's army and navy and lead early combats to the advantage of Wiman Chosun. Afterwards, the two countries started negotiations, which, however, came to a rupture after all. It is probable that Wudi of Han went on the conquest in person and was at a region near Paesu. After the negotiations was failed, the tide of war turned against Chosun troops. For the armies of Wiman Chosun above Paesu was defeated by the armies of Han's General taken up the position of left flank, and thus the defense line of Paesu was broken through. Consequently, the army and navy of Han joined to lay siege to Wanggeom-seong (王險城). It is the general opinion that Wanggeom-seong was located on the northern shore of the ‘Daedong’ River. It is hard to imagine that Wiman Chosun, whose territory extended thousands of li in all directions (方數千里), had its capital near Paesu, which was on the western boundary. Wanggeom-seong defended successfully against the enemy's attack for months. However, as the war was protracted, a rebellion occurred within Wiman Chosun, King Ugeo was assassinated, and Wanggeom-seong (王儉城) was captured after all. Wiman Chosun failed to block supplies for Han armies. In conclusion, the consequential protraction of the war may be viewed as another cause of the fall of Wiman Chosun.

Goryeo’s Perceptions of its Northern boundary and the ‘Alternative Aprok River' -Verifying the entities of the ‘Hwa-ju Aprok river' and the ‘Yoha Aprok River'-

KyeongJin Yoon | 2021, (118) | pp.139~179 | number of Cited : 2

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A Study on the Repatriation of ‘PIROIN’ meaning Captives in Early Chosun dynasty -Focusing on Nakamura Hidedaka's Theory of Guardian of Peace, ‘Transition from Pirates(Waegu) to Merchants’-

Han, Yoonhee | 2021, (118) | pp.181~227 | number of Cited : 3

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Hidedaka Nakamura, a pioneer in the pre-modern Korean-Japanese relations history, believes that "the number of Japanese people coming and going with Chosun gradually increased through the repatriation of captives(piroin), and eventually the position of pirates(waegu) turned into the status of merchants." This means that pirates(waegu) and merchants are different. However, it was recently revealed that Nakamura was an imperial oriented historian. Therefore, it was judged that this argument also needed to be reviewed, whether or not it was affected by such ideological influence. In this paper, this paper is named as the theory of Hidedaka Nakamura's "transition from pirates(waegu) to merchants“, and examined the range of the period between King Taejo and King Taejong in terms of paper. And in this paper, we have focused on the following three things. First, did the invasion of weagu decrease as the number of Japanese people coming and going to Chosun increased? Second, were weagu and merchants different from each other? Third, what is the significance of the repatriation of captives(piroin) in early Chosun? As a result of the review, the invasion of weagu also increased sharply at the time when Japanese people coming to Chosun increased rapidly. Since then, the pirates were intermittent, but continued to invade Chosun. In addition, in China at the same time as the Chosun Taejo-Taejong year, pirates were invading on a large scale almost every year. In other words, the pirates who invaded Chosun moved to China. From the historical records, it can be seen that pirates invading China are no different from beings invading Joseon. When they encountered a situation in which they were defended, they acted as merchants, and in the opposite situation, they returned to the position of pirates. In other words, they always had two aspects of a pirate and a merchant, just like the front and back sides of a coin, only different aspects depending on the region and situation. Therefore, it seems that the repatriation of captives(piroin) in the early Chosun period did not convert pirates into merchants, but ①moved the invading area, ②changed their existence according to the region and situation, such as 'pirates' in China and 'merchant' in Chosun.

An Analysis of the Perception of the Imjin War through the war poetry of Yakpo Jeongtak

Choi go-gyeong | 2021, (118) | pp.229~254 | number of Cited : 3

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Yakpo Jeongtak was a man who actively engaged in military and political activities for the country during the Imjin War. Due to his great exploits, the prior studies mainly dealt with war strategies or tactics. The study on his activities was done in ideological aspect due to the status of Toegye, Nammyeong's disciple and the works that showed and Neo-Confucian study. But many of the war poetry he left behind were relatively not enlightened, and only a few of his works were used in analysis of the world of his poetry. Thus, In this paper, we took a look at the perception of the age of Yakpo, which looked at the Imjin War, focusing on his war poetry of his collection of works, the book named ‘Yakpojip’(the collection of Jeongtak) and records he left behind. He was objectively recognized the situation of the Imjin War, which was characterized as an international war, and how great the participation of the Ming soldiers and their combined operations played a significant role in the Imjin War. He expressed strong opposition to the peace treaty with Japan and secretly expressed his dissatisfaction with Ming, who eventually reached a negotiated settlement and retreated, but as a farewell envoy, he listened to their demands and wrote poetries praising their exploits. Yakpo, the chief policy maker and implementer of the Joseon Dynasty, identified the situation of Ming soldiers and responded to the international situation. His poetries were sensitive to diplomatic relations centered on the Ming, unlike other war poetries of the same time. It is hoped that such research, which combines the war poetry with the perception of war by a person, will contribute to the study of military history in the future from the perspective of a combination of "literature" and "war" instead of the existing study of literary history that focused on individuals.

Toward the Korea-led Responsibility of National defense

Hong Kun Sik | 2021, (118) | pp.255~275 | number of Cited : 0

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2021, Vol., No.118