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@article{ART001255247},
author={이종판 and 코야나기 준이치},
title={A Study on the Failure of Prediction to the Chinese Communists Forces’ Intervention in the Korean War－ The Intelligence Activities of the FEC －},
journal={military history},
issn={1598-317X},
year={2008},
number={67},
pages={55-102},
doi={10.29212/mh.2008..67.55}

TY - JOUR
AU - 이종판
AU - 코야나기 준이치
TI - A Study on the Failure of Prediction to the Chinese Communists Forces’ Intervention in the Korean War－ The Intelligence Activities of the FEC －
JO - military history
PY - 2008
VL - null
IS - 67
PB - Military History Institute, MND
SP - 55
EP - 102
SN - 1598-317X
AB - This study is to investigate the failure of prediction to the Chinese Communist Forces(CCF)’s intervention in the Korean War in 1950. For this study, I investigated the intelligence operations of the Far East Command(FEC) during the two months from the day of the 15th September 1950, when the Incheon Amphibious Landing Operations were held in Incheon. I have investigated the following two questions. The first question was the reason why the FEC did not understand the possibilities of the intervention even if they received many warning and signals that implicated the intervention. The second question was the reason why the US Government accepted the FEC’s misestimation about the possibilities of the CCF’s intervention without reestimation. As I reviewed these two questions, I could find the cause of failure. The reason why the FEC did not understand the signal of the CCF’s intervention in the Korean War was as follows. Firstly, many complications with respect to the CCF’s intervention in the Korean War have made the uncertainty of intelligence magnified. Second, as the signals about he CCF’s intervention was ambiguous, they were buried in the noise that implicated the possibilities of the CCF’s invasion against the Taiwan. Third, as estimations are activities human beings do not like, there exists possibilities of mistake during information processing. All these factors made the FEC underestimate the possibilities of CCF’s intervention in the Korean war. As centralized information systems did nor work properly, the US Government accepted the FEC’s misestimation about the possibilities of CCF’s intervention without reestimation. As a result of the Japanese Invasion against the Pearl Harbor during the Second World War, CIA were equipped with system to filter many diverse intelligence during the Korean War. But as intelligence about far-east area were preoccupied by the FEC, CIA did not work properly which should reestimate intelligence accurately. As shown, the US intelligence system during the Korean War was operated in distorted way. Misestimation of the FEC about the possibilities of CCF’s intervention which were received by CIA affected the US political decisions about the Korean War greatly. These results from the fact that the US Government during the Korean War depended two much on the intelligence received from the FEC, and the FEC involved US policies. As shown, distortions of intelligence system during the Korean War made failures in intelligence area, misinterpretation of the FEC(intelligence producer) and decision maker(intelligence consumer)’s misinterpretation were mingled. That is the reason why the US Government failed to predict the possibilities of CCF’s intervention in the Korean War. Even if we could say there were some distortions when centralized intelligence system which emerged after the Pacific War settled down, we could also say that these distortions of intelligence system was due to the FEC.
KW - The Korean War;The Chinese Communist Forces(CCF)’s Intervention;FEC;Intelligence Activities;Intelligence System;Central Intelligence Agency(CIA);National Intelligence Estimate(NIE);Human -Source Intelligence;Communication Intelligence;Imager
DO - 10.29212/mh.2008..67.55
ER -

이종판 and 코야나기 준이치. (2008). A Study on the Failure of Prediction to the Chinese Communists Forces’ Intervention in the Korean War－ The Intelligence Activities of the FEC －. military history, 67, 55-102.

이종판 and 코야나기 준이치. 2008, "A Study on the Failure of Prediction to the Chinese Communists Forces’ Intervention in the Korean War－ The Intelligence Activities of the FEC －", military history, no.67, pp.55-102. Available from: doi:10.29212/mh.2008..67.55

이종판, 코야나기 준이치 "A Study on the Failure of Prediction to the Chinese Communists Forces’ Intervention in the Korean War－ The Intelligence Activities of the FEC －" military history 67 pp.55-102 (2008) : 55.

이종판, 코야나기 준이치. A Study on the Failure of Prediction to the Chinese Communists Forces’ Intervention in the Korean War－ The Intelligence Activities of the FEC －. 2008; 67 : 55-102. Available from: doi:10.29212/mh.2008..67.55

이종판 and 코야나기 준이치. "A Study on the Failure of Prediction to the Chinese Communists Forces’ Intervention in the Korean War－ The Intelligence Activities of the FEC －" military history no.67(2008) : 55-102.doi: 10.29212/mh.2008..67.55

이종판; 코야나기 준이치. A Study on the Failure of Prediction to the Chinese Communists Forces’ Intervention in the Korean War－ The Intelligence Activities of the FEC －. military history, 67, 55-102. doi: 10.29212/mh.2008..67.55

이종판; 코야나기 준이치. A Study on the Failure of Prediction to the Chinese Communists Forces’ Intervention in the Korean War－ The Intelligence Activities of the FEC －. military history. 2008; 67 55-102. doi: 10.29212/mh.2008..67.55

이종판, 코야나기 준이치. A Study on the Failure of Prediction to the Chinese Communists Forces’ Intervention in the Korean War－ The Intelligence Activities of the FEC －. 2008; 67 : 55-102. Available from: doi:10.29212/mh.2008..67.55

이종판 and 코야나기 준이치. "A Study on the Failure of Prediction to the Chinese Communists Forces’ Intervention in the Korean War－ The Intelligence Activities of the FEC －" military history no.67(2008) : 55-102.doi: 10.29212/mh.2008..67.55