KJCKorea
Journal Central

The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Divisions of the North Korean Army were founded in North Korea, and the 5th, 6th and 12th Divisions returned to China from 1949 to 1950 and were incorporated into the North Korean Army. The 6th Division was selected as an auxiliary attack unit for the 1st Corps because of lack of combat experience in China. The 5th Division was selected as the rear unit because it had less combat experience than the 6th Division. On the other hand, the 12th Division was the most attacked unit in the Chinese Civil War, so it was decided to be the main attack unit of the eastern front. The 1st Division, 2nd Division, and 3rd Division were the most suitable for the modern offensive as they were trained as regular army for 3 years and 11 months. The 3rd and 4th Divisions were modeled after the Soviet light infantry division, so they were superior to other divisions. Therefore, 1st Division, 3rd Division, and 4th Division were selected as the main attack units of the 1st Corps.

This article sets out to develop a geopolitical vision that aims to enlarge the living space available to Korean compatriots, as seen from the perspective of the Republic of Korea. First, it explores the fundamental principles of this vision. I begin by rejecting the ‘bridge state theory’, which assumes that continental and maritime powers meet on the Korean Peninsula, giving Korea a role in connecting them. Instead, I propose that South Korea promote a ‘strategy of compounding continental and maritime powers’, whereby South Korea herself becomes a continental and maritime power, prioritizing advancement into the continent. Secondly, I present a plan for entering the continent. In the long term, I propose building on and developing the ‘Eurasia Initiative’ of the Park Geun-hye administration in an attempt to succeed the Northern policies of the preceding Korean governments. In the short term, I suggest creating and expanding spaces for peace and symbiosis centered on the border areas of Manchuria, Primorye and the northern parts of North Korea. Thirdly, I develop a maritime strategy. On a global scale, Korea should engage with and leverage the US Indo-Pacific strategy while avoiding becoming embroiled in the US–China conflict. In the short term, I propose viewing the East, West and South Seas around the Korean Peninsula and the East China Sea as one Mediterranean Sea and establishing, disseminating and implementing the concept of ‘Northeast Asia Mediterranean for Peace and Prosperity’.

This paper categorizes Ki Kwang-seo’s research on modern North Korean history into three main areas and examines the practical implications of his work. His book, The Formation of the North Korean State and the Soviet Union is a comprehensive scholarly work that makes full use of archival materials from the former Soviet Union to extend the ‘archives revolution’ to the study of North Korean history. His Theory of “Joint Agency” provided a historical perspective that captures the complexity of North Korea’s state formation, thereby enabling a comprehensive understanding of both North Korea’s autonomy and its international character. Following the issue of North Korea’s state formation, the research topic in which Ki Kwang-seo took a deep interest was the history of left-right and North-South confrontation during the eight years following liberation. He elucidated the reality of the anti-Soviet and anti-communist movements that took place in North Korea after liberation and presented notable research findings on the defection and abduction of South Korean political figures to the North during the Korean War, as well as the policy regarding the “New Liberation Zones” that became North Korean territory as a result of the war. Ki Kwang-seo proposed that both South and North Korea should now mutually recognize each other as states possessing their own legitimacy and systemic stability. He argued that, since North Korea’s current state did not come about overnight, we must observe the situation with patience. He emphasized that, rather than unilaterally expecting North Korea to change, both North and South Korea must change together to achieve a sense of commonality.