본문 바로가기
  • Home

Spinoza and a Kind of Materialism - The Interpretation of Stuart Hampshire -

  • Journal of Humanities
  • 2019, (74), pp.315-336
  • DOI : 10.31310/HUM.074.11
  • Publisher : Institute for Humanities
  • Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities
  • Received : July 7, 2019
  • Accepted : August 19, 2019
  • Published : August 31, 2019

Sam-Yel Park 1

1숭실대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

For Spinoza, the relative weighting of thought and extension is equal, and therefore neither can we give greater weight to the body nor to the mind: the body is not prior to the mind nor vice versa. However, from time to time, some commentators give weight either to one or to the other. Furthermore, among the various interpretations of Spinoza's mind-body problem, there is a notable materialistic point of view: modified materialism by Stuart Hampshire. In this paper, I considered the appropriateness of his perspective on Spinoza and discussed some of the problems which arise from his interpretation and some of the inadequacy of applying it to Spinoza's mind-body theory. For Hampshire, the physical aspect is more coherent and fuller than the mental, and he sees Spinoza as a (non-reductive) materialist. Therefore, it is problematic to adopt Hampshire's interpretation as Spinoza's mind-body theory. Spinozistic identity between the mind and the body should be found in that which encompasses both the mental and physical, and thus Spinoza’s theory should be regarded as monism with materialism and idealism as the double aspects of his monistic substance.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2022 are currently being built.