2016, Vol., No.22

PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.5

pISSN : 1975-1621 / eISSN : 2092-0873
https://journal.kci.go.kr/insewtdgu

In the introduction of the first edition[A], Kant defined the Critique of Reason as ‘A Court of Justice’ and denoted as ‘The True Court of Justice’. I hope to elucidate and examine the essence of “Critique” in the context of a court system. By examining the Critique in the context of a court system, or more specifically, focusing on the duty of the court of justice, we can explore the basis of Critique. In order to do so, we must first confirm that Critique of Pure Reason is a court; second we must understand why it is indeed viewed as a court and finally we must identify that a court system inevitably arises from the duty of a Court of Reason. Next, we will discuss that the establishment of Critique of Pure Reason should be regarded as a momentous duty in the historic context of philosophical reasoning, and that such establishment marks the turnaround of the basis of my argument. Lastly, I will show the relationship between the inherent duty of a court of Reason and a transcendental cognition, then inquire about the meaning of its relationship. By appreciating the establishment of a court based upon the characters of Critique of Pure Reason and its inherent duty, the entirety of Critique will be better elucidated.

This paper aims paradoxically the necessity of anxiety through the reilluminations of the philosophical(Kierkegaard) and psychodramatical(Moreno) meanings of anxiety. Kierkegaard asserts that only the spiritual being i.e., a human can experience anxiety. He sees anxiety as a psychological state that human as a free being experiences when he leaps qualitatively from one state to another state. The person who seeks stability without the true human spirit, that is, the person who is bound by unfreedom cannot experience anxiety. Only, through the infinite free spirit, a finite human can experience anxiety. That is, for Kierkegaard, anxiety is a person's psychological state facing the possibility of freedom. In psychotherapy area, anxiety is not always treated as something that needs to be removed. As a synthesis of psychotherapy, psychodrama relates anxiety to trying to return to a cosmic being. Human as a cosmic being is eager forr free transformation to the whole universe, and anxiety occurs in cosmic hunger to maintain cosmic identity. It is related with trying to reach a role reversal with the whole universe, attempting to have creative encounters with other beings. Anxiety is the state of hunger for this encounter. As indicated above, for Kierkegaard and psychodrama, anxiety is understood in the prospect freedom and encounter, and by fully suggesting the different view of value and necessity of anxiety, it provides the new power of starting a life from anxiety.

This paper argues that Adorno’s account of religion fundamentally aims to go toward social criticism on the basis of some theoretical works that critically examine some religious implications in his philosophy. Adorno explores how christianity has controlled society and has given some legitimacy of the powers and collusion with the powers, then he criticizes metaphysics of death, institutionalization of religion, the role of the clergy, sexual rule, christian roots of anti-Semitism. Here he doubts the potentiality of religious emancipation and suggests the true religious role and ideas. When we consider Adorno’s religious ideas of political theology, particularly if its social practice and internal logic of religion works properly, there should be an ambivalent evaluation on it. Adorno’s religious thought seems to involve failures to notice the combination of positivity and negativity and the lack of empirical argument. These make Adorno’s account of religion problematic. Nevertheless, I would like to argue that his criticism of religion as social criticism is still useful for criticizing and searching for alternatives to the unfinished secularization in Korea. His critical reflection of the relation between Judaism and Christianity shows us a theoretical basis that would deal with religious fundamentalism and religious conflict in postmodern religious pluralism.