@article{ART001414216},
author={박철호},
title={A Possibility of Establishing Physicalism through A posteriori Necessity},
journal={PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE},
issn={1975-1621},
year={2005},
number={2},
pages={145-170}
TY - JOUR
AU - 박철호
TI - A Possibility of Establishing Physicalism through A posteriori Necessity
JO - PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE
PY - 2005
VL - null
IS - 2
PB - Research Institute for East-West Thought
SP - 145
EP - 170
SN - 1975-1621
AB - Is phenomenal consciousness, such as pain, a physical property or a nonphysical one? Dualists argue that consciousness cannot be reductively explained because it is not logically supervenient on the physical properties, and thus that it is 'over and above' the physical properties. But physicalists refute dualists' argument by claiming that logical supervenience is not necessary for reductive explanation, and so dualists cannot infer the failure of the latter from that of the former. They insist that consciousness can be reductively explained by identity. Meanwhile, from the fact that there cannot be given definite functional analysis of consciousness, we can conceive of a zombie which is identical with us in all physical aspects except for its not having phenomenal consciousness. In dualists' view, the conceivability of a zombie entails the metaphysical possibility of it, and so physicalism is false. But, in physicalists' view, the conceivability does not entail the metaphysical possibility in the same way that the conceivability of a world in which water is XYZ does not entail the metaphysical possibility of a world in which it is XYZ because water's being H20 is a posteriori necessary. Dualist Chalmers points out that when physicalists conceive of a world in which water is XYZ, what they really conceive of is just a world in which 'waterish stuff' is XYZ, not a world in which 'water(H2O)' is XYZ. He continues that the conceivability of a world in which 'waterish stuff' is water entails the metaphysical possibility of such a world. This essay will bring it to light what is the role of identity and a posteriori necessity in establishing physicalism.
KW - consciousness;logical supervenience;reductive explanation;a posteriori necessity;metaphysical possibility;conceivability
DO -
UR -
ER -
박철호. (2005). A Possibility of Establishing Physicalism through A posteriori Necessity. PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE, 2, 145-170.
박철호. 2005, "A Possibility of Establishing Physicalism through A posteriori Necessity", PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE, no.2, pp.145-170.
박철호 "A Possibility of Establishing Physicalism through A posteriori Necessity" PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE 2 pp.145-170 (2005) : 145.
박철호. A Possibility of Establishing Physicalism through A posteriori Necessity. 2005; 2 : 145-170.
박철호. "A Possibility of Establishing Physicalism through A posteriori Necessity" PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE no.2(2005) : 145-170.
박철호. A Possibility of Establishing Physicalism through A posteriori Necessity. PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE, 2, 145-170.
박철호. A Possibility of Establishing Physicalism through A posteriori Necessity. PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE. 2005; 2 145-170.
박철호. A Possibility of Establishing Physicalism through A posteriori Necessity. 2005; 2 : 145-170.
박철호. "A Possibility of Establishing Physicalism through A posteriori Necessity" PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE no.2(2005) : 145-170.
