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@article{ART001294387},
author={김남곤},
title={Shareholding structure and Firm Value},
journal={Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies},
issn={1225-8539},
year={2008},
volume={15},
number={2},
pages={79-95},
doi={10.18107/japs.2008.15.2.004}

TY - JOUR
AU - 김남곤
TI - Shareholding structure and Firm Value
JO - Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies
PY - 2008
VL - 15
IS - 2
PB - Institute of Global Affairs
SP - 79
EP - 95
SN - 1225-8539
AB - The Korean economy has experienced many changes in corporate governance since the IMF crisis, therefore the crisis brought an enormous change to Korean firms. Coporate governance deals with the rights and responsibilities of a controlling shareholder, company’s management and various stakeholders. Corporate governance affects market confidence as well as firm value. Therefore good corporate governance is essential to firm value. Both the legal protection of investors and some form of concentrated ownership are essential elements of a good corporate governance system. Legal protection and large investors are complementary in an effective corporate governance system. The most enthusiastic assessments of American corporate governance system come from those who put greater emphasis on the role of legal protection than on that of large investors. In contrast, advocates of the German and Japanese corporate governance system point to the benefits of permanent long term investors relative to those of takeovers. This paper, from the perspective of firm value, analyzes the effect of the shareholding matrix after the IMF crisis. This paper employs two proxies of firm value, Tobin’s Q and EV/EBITDA, and study whether firm valuation varies with corporate governance. The primary findings are summarized in the following way. Using a sample of non‐financial firms listed on th Korea Stock Exchange over the 2000~2005 period, the test results indicates that the firm valuation depends critically on Cashflow Rights Ratio. Specifically, this paper finds a significant and positive correlation between Tobin’s q or industry‐adjusted EV/EBITDA and high Cashflow Rights Ratio. Taken togher, these results suggest that the successful corporate governance systems rely on some combination of concentrated ownership and legal protection of investors, therefore good corporate governance is essential to increase the firm value.
KW -
DO - 10.18107/japs.2008.15.2.004
ER -

김남곤. (2008). Shareholding structure and Firm Value. Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, 15(2), 79-95.

김남곤. 2008, "Shareholding structure and Firm Value", Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, vol.15, no.2 pp.79-95. Available from: doi:10.18107/japs.2008.15.2.004

김남곤 "Shareholding structure and Firm Value" Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 15.2 pp.79-95 (2008) : 79.

김남곤. Shareholding structure and Firm Value. 2008; 15(2), 79-95. Available from: doi:10.18107/japs.2008.15.2.004

김남곤. "Shareholding structure and Firm Value" Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 15, no.2 (2008) : 79-95.doi: 10.18107/japs.2008.15.2.004

김남곤. Shareholding structure and Firm Value. Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, 15(2), 79-95. doi: 10.18107/japs.2008.15.2.004

김남곤. Shareholding structure and Firm Value. Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies. 2008; 15(2) 79-95. doi: 10.18107/japs.2008.15.2.004

김남곤. Shareholding structure and Firm Value. 2008; 15(2), 79-95. Available from: doi:10.18107/japs.2008.15.2.004

김남곤. "Shareholding structure and Firm Value" Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 15, no.2 (2008) : 79-95.doi: 10.18107/japs.2008.15.2.004