KJCKorea
Journal Central

Thispaper constructsathree-dimensional analytical framework encompassing GVC participation, positioning, and international competitiveness, utilizing the 2023 edition of the OECD Global Input-Output Database. It conducts a comparative analysis of the evolutionary changes in the linkages, specialization patterns, and international competitiveness of the high-tech manufacturing sectors in South Korea, China, and Japan from 1995 to 2020. The findings reveal a shift in the GVC linkage center for the high-tech manufacturing industries of the three countries from the NAFTA region to the RCEP region. Leveraging their respective factor endowments and technologicaladvantages,theyhaveadopteddifferentiatedlinkagestrategies withintheRCEP,NAFTA,andEUregions.Regardingtheirpositionswithin GVCs, South Korea exhibits the highest participation rate; China is situated in downstream segments but its position is continuously improving; while Japan predominantly occupies upstream segments, although its advantage is weakening. In terms of international competitiveness, the three countries haveformedacompetitivelandscapecharacterizedbydivergentdevelopment trajectories: South Korea maintains a leading edge, China's competitiveness is on the rise, and Japan's is declining. Their development pathways are distinct:SouthKoreahasenhanceditsinternationalcompetitivenessthrough technologicalbreakthroughsinspecificfields,yetitsfundamentalinnovation stillreliesonexternalsources.Chinahasleveragedtechnologicalintegration innovation and economies of scale to embed itself in low-value-added productionstagesandisascendingtomedium-andhigh-value-addedstages, with some sectors reaching upstream positions. Japan has reinforced technologicalcontrolandselectivelycontractedproductionstagestomaintain its upstream advantages, while simultaneously expanding into downstream service sectors to consolidate its competitiveness. This research, grounded in technology, market, and production dynamics, elucidates the strategic divergences among South Korea, China, and Japan in the logic of regional value chain restructuring and GVC governance participation. It concludes that cooperation among the three countries in non-strategic high-tech manufacturing technology, market access, and production domains would be instrumental in establishing a resilient and dynamically innovative Northeast Asian regional cooperation framework.

ThisstudyexaminestheChineseCommunistParty’s(CCP)policiestoward thenewsocialstratafromtheperspectiveoftheUnitedFront,withafocus on the Xi Jinping era. Since the period of reform and opening-up, the new socialstratahaverapidlyemergedandbeendefinedbytheCCPas“builders of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” thereby becoming akeytargetoftheUnitedFront.AstheCCPemphasizedtheneedtoorganize thenewsocialstrata,itestablishedtheBureauofNewSocialStrataAffairs andconvenedNationalUnitedFrontWorkConferences,makingUnitedFront work targeting the new social strata increasingly concrete and systematic. Inthisprocess,variousinitiatives,includingNewSocialStrataAssociations, United Front Work Practice Innovation Bases for the new social strata, and NewSocialStrataServiceTeams,wereactivelypromoted.Fromthestate’s perspective, these policies have produced several achievements, such as the expansionoforganizationalinfluenceoverthenewsocialstrata,thepromotion of interactions between the state and the new social strata, and the enhancement of possibilities for their broad mobilization and integration. At the same time, however, these efforts have also exposed a number of challenges, including difficulties in organizing the new social strata due to their complexity and fluidity, the limited effectiveness of New Social Strata Associations, and the relatively low level of participation by members of the new social strata in state-led organizational initiatives. In light of these findings, this study explores the significance and implications of the CCP’s policies toward the new social strata in the Xi Jinping era.

From 2017 to 2025, under the backdrop of profound adjustments in the global power structure, continuous tension in the security environment in East Asia, and intensified strategic competition between China and the United States, the US-Japan alliance underwent significant transformation. It shifted in terms of external functions, internal structure, and regional influence. The US-Japan alliance transformed from a traditional defensive alliance to a composite strategic alliance with regional shaping capabilities, presenting characteristics such as external function expansion and structural adjustment. The functions of the US-Japan alliance have spilled over beyond its original scope, manifested in the advancement and expansion of its military functions, as well as the "topic expansion" based on this; the restructuring of the US-Japan alliance is characterized by its gradual evolution from a "highly asymmetrical" state to a "quasi-equal division of labor". After Sanae Takaichi took office, the political ecosystem in Japan evolved to provide institutional support for the transformation of the US-Japan alliance. At the same time, the United States completed the institutionalization of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", and the transformation of the US-Japan alliance demonstrated a phased stabilization feature. In the future, the US-Japan alliance will continue to transform towards strategic deployment axis centralization, modernization of alliance management, and integration of military and security. This process will also have adverse effects on the regional security environment and China's peaceful rise.