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The Analysis of Cournot and Bertrand Competition among Korean Life Insurance Companies Using Externality-Induced Endogenous Timing Game

  • Journal of Insurance and Finance
  • 2009, 20(3), pp.41-66
  • Publisher : Korea Insurance Research Institute
  • Research Area : Social Science > Business Management

이민환 1 CHOI KANGSIK 2

1인하대학교
2부산대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

The objective of this paper is to investigate the competitions among Korean life insurance companies, using an endogenous timing game in the presence of asymmetric externalities. This application is appropriate, since Korean life insurance market confronts various types of risks as the market is liberalized, and different types of companies, which can be categorized as large size, small size, and foreign companies, are competing one another. Our endogenous timing game model provides two main results. First, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the Cournot-type production volume competition is that the small firms become leaders endogenously due to asymmetric externalities. Second, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the Bertrand-type price competition game is that big firms become leaders.

Citation status

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