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The Effects of Incentive Alignment on Debt Maturity Structure

  • Journal of Insurance and Finance
  • 2012, 23(3), pp.95-122
  • Publisher : Korea Insurance Research Institute
  • Research Area : Social Science > Business Management

Park Myung-Ho 1 Park, Dae-Keun 2 Yun, Jeongsun 3

1한국조세연구원
2엑센츄어
3국민대학교

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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates whether and how corporate governance affects the maturity structure of corporate debts in Korea. We find that managerial ownership tends to reduce the maturity of debts for a low-liquidity risk firm. On the other hand, firms with liquidity risk prefer a long-term debt regardless of managerial ownership. This suggests that corporate governance tends to reduce the maturity of debt only for the firms that do not experience liquidity risk. We also find that the interaction effect between managerial ownership and growth opportunity is negative. This implies that the negative effect of managerial ownership is more prominent for firms with growth opportunity.

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