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An analysis on the transfer of supervision authority of a government-funded entity from the perspective of rational choice of bureaucratic structure.

  • Korean Society and Public Administration
  • Abbr : KSPA
  • 2006, 16(4), pp.89-116
  • Publisher : Seoul Association For Public Administration
  • Research Area : Social Science > Public Administration

HA TAE SOO 1

1경기대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzed the transfer of the supervising authority for the government-funded Consumer Protection Board(CPB) with an application of Moe's theory i.e. rational choice of bureaucracy structure. According to the theory, the structure of government bureaucracy is a product of political compromise among civic groups, lawmakers, the President, and related bureaucrats. As the paper analyzed the CPB, it added a government-funded entity to the participants. As of the end of 2005, the supervisor of the CPB is going to change from the Ministry of Finance and Economy(MoFE) to the Fair Trade Commission(FTC) under the change of macro-trend from the developmental state to the developmental regulatory state. The transfer of supervising authority from the MoFE to the FTC resulted from political compromises among civic groups, lawmakers, the Blue House, the bureaucrats of both the MoFE and FTC, and the CPB. This paper examined the whole processes of political compromises. It analyzed, first, the primary position of the actors and then the reasons why they changed their positions in the later stages of political compromises. The change of macro-trend in the roles of the state, the eight-year old issue-raising of the FTC and consequently emerging sympathy among relevant actors, the intervention of the Blue House, and the logical and open attitudes of the participants to the issue can be pinned down as main reasons for the policy-making.

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