2003, Vol.12, No.2

Journal of Regulation Studies 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.78

pISSN : 1738-7132
https://journal.kci.go.kr/ksrs2002

Business associations are known as voluntarily organized interest groups that seek to maximize members' interest through pulling collective resources of the industry they seek to represent. In examining 188 business associations under the 'jurisdiction' of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy in Korea, it was found that although they were organized to represent the interest of the industry in question, they were often functioning as quasi-nongovernmental organizations in terms of their facilitation in the policy implementation process. It was found that the Ministry had played active roles in creating new business associations in newly emerging industries by selectively sponsoring lucrative contracts to them while industrial policies targeted towards 'declining industries' were implemented through those business associations that kept good working relationship with the Ministry. Although there exist various different types of business associations in terms of their legal establishment, those groups that were delegated to carry out the Ministry's industrial policies and other subsidy programs were 'Quangotized' in terms of their relationship with the State Many leading associations have effectively become extra-bureaucratic groups, a sign of state corporatism revisiting in Korea. This has created not only the legitimacy question concerning associations' representation of members' interest but also accountability problems in the delivery of important public policies.

Changing markets have generated an increasing variety and use of horizontal cooperation. More complete and updated guidance is need to improve transparency regarding the applicability of Article 19 Korean Fair Trade Act in this area. Like U.S.A. and EU competition agencies, Korean Fair Trade Commission(KFTC) made「Guidelines for Collaborative Acts」 including analytical framework for collaborative acts. According to the Guidelines, KFTC can analyse anti-competitive effects and pro-competitive benefits. Moreover the Guidelines help to analyse if a certain cooperation among competitors is illegal or not. Because horizontal cooperation can lead to substantial economic benefits. Therefore it may not regard cooperation among competitors as hardcore cartel in applying to the Guidelines. In anti-trust analysis, Market share and market concentration may also not be considered excessively. On the other hand, KFTC has to endeavor after applying for the Guidelines step by step under the anti-trust process.

With regard to a possible multilateral framework on competition policy, discussions have been underway at various international organizations including the WTO. This issue has been one of the main issues at the WTO for it is believed that anti-competitive practices undermine the gains of trade liberalization. Opinions exchanged at the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy show that a multilateral framework is necessary to deal with competition policy-related trade concerns and for the contribution of competition policy to international trade and development. However, discussions have not been developed into a formal negotiation stage, due to the lack of consensus on the modalities for the the multilateral framework agreement. While evaluating various approaches to a possible multilateral framework and looking into the WTO's work on the basic elements of the multilateral framework under the Doha Mandate, this paper envisons what should be a right direction to pursue for the future negotiations on a multilateral framework on interaction between trade and competition policy. Although the Cancun Ministerial Conference failed to reach an agreement on the modalities of a multilateral framework on competition policy, there is no doubt that negotiations will continue in the future. This paper is aimed at contributing to such progress.