2005, Vol.14, No.1

Journal of Regulation Studies 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.78

pISSN : 1738-7132
https://journal.kci.go.kr/ksrs2002

In the current situation focusing largely on the regulatory reforms of national government in Korea, this study examines the present state of regulatory reforms in local government in Korea. It intends to contribute to making the current regulatory reform systems in local level more efficient and workable by analyzing and improving the present local systems for regulatory management and reform. For this purpose, it particularly reviews and analyzes the registration system of regulations to find some problems which can be categorized into two types: ‘ones in registration system of registration' and ‘ones in contents in regulation.' In addition, it suggests more practical and specific guidelines for registration of regulations by category, supplemented and supported by cases (in laws) for each guideline. These guidelines are expected to help the local regulatory officials sort out, judge and register regulations more efficiently and correctly. Finally, from the broader perspective, it makes several policy suggestions for improvement of the regulatory reforms in Korea.

This paper critically reviews the rationale of the “Restrictions on Equity Investment” (REI), provided in Lim (2003), and also the proposal by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) to base regulation using the “Indices of Ownership-Control Disparity” (IOCD). We find that Lim (2003) analyzes firms' equity investments only in a static one-period model, and much of the analysis tends to lack supportive explanation for critical assumptions made, while different equity investments are unrealistically treated homogeneously. On the other hand, we find critical possible problems in the event that the KFTC restricts firms' voting rights based on the levels of IOCD calculated. Also, IOCD is problematic if it is used as a criterion for exempting firms from REI.

In this paper, we first of all tried to evaluate the deadweight loss induced by the monopoly of Korea Electric Power Corporation using econometrics method. Second, we also pursued to calculate the monopolist price as well as perfectly competitive price to derive the economic loss from monopolist in Korean electric market. The third issue is that the price of oligopolistic competitive market is derived under the condition that the power sector as well as distribution sector in the electricity industry are all successively restructured. According to the empirical results, we found that the regulation price controled by the government was much higher than that of hypothetical competitive electric market. Next, the welfare loss out of total revenue amount to 7.61% in 1982 year, which was dramatically reduced to 1.15% in 2000 year. If the distribution sector of electric market were restructured successfully up to the third stage, we can derived the remarkable result that welfare loss under the oligopolistic competitive market is much less 1/1000 than that of a monopoly market.