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Brouwer's Notion of Number and the Problem of Psychologism

  • Philosophical Investigation
  • 2006, 20(), pp.267~300
  • Publisher : Institute of philosophy in Chung-Ang Univ.
  • Research Area : Humanities > Philosophy

Jinhyeong Kim 1

1중앙대학교

Candidate

ABSTRACT

Brouwer understands 'numbers' as intuition, not concept. For him, numbers are conceived of mental entities. There has been an inclination to interpret his intuitionism as empirical psychology. Contrary to this view, I argues that Brouwer's number theory is not a version of Millian, or early Husserlian mathematical psychologism by showing that his 'I' or 'ego' can be identified with the 'transcendental subject' of late Husserl. In order to strengthen my conclusion, I will argue that his notion of natural numbers can satisfy Frege's two conditions, 'identity' and 'distinguishability,' which is necessary to define number as units. I emphasize in the course that Brouwer's intuitionism is a version of anti-Platonism, and that Brouwer intended to establish the appropriate boundary of mathematics and define the way mathematicians must go.

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