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Animal Pain and Sensation of Plants

맹주만 1

1중앙대학교

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ABSTRACT

Peter Singer as a preference utilitarian argues for vegetarian diets which is based on the principle of equal consideration of interests and sentience as the capacity to feel pleasure or pain. What is more, he maintains that if a being is able to feel pains, it does mean that he is a conscious being. Based on these reasons, he argue that the differences feeling pains in quantity between beings is justified the ways of treating them differently. Therefore, on top of that, although there is little possibility of finding out that a plant can feel pains, he say that if the plants were such a sentient being, we should treat her as a moral being. He added, although it is right, but if quantity which animal feels pains is very great small than human and animal’s, vegetarian diets are still better than meat-eating. In this paper I will try to show that Singer’s argument is not valid. I will argue that Singer’s argument can be justified what a being is a conscious being means what it is a sentient being, because his reasoning which is excluded his other sensations except pain-sensation is a kind of arbitrarily preferential considerations. Although a plant cannot feel something like animal’s pain, it seems to me that such a state of plant do not mean she is not conscious, moreover if the plant has some sensations, it can be said that she is also a conscious being.

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