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Hume’s Sentimental Aesthetics and the Principle of Sympathy

Maeng, Jooman 1 Kim, Dasom 1

1중앙대학교

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to inquire into the problems of disaccord between aesthetic judgments. The problem of aesthetic judgments and their disaccord is one of the core themes in western modern philosophy, especially aesthetics or theory of taste. Modern aesthetics has developed with disputes about this problem. Hume stands at the peak in the course of their studies. In his 'A Treatise of Human Nature' and essay 'Of the Standard of Taste' Hume shows why this matter happens, and how we can dissolve this. We interpret Hume's aesthetic as sentimental aesthetics, relational aesthetics, and aesthetics of sympathy. Hume's aesthetics is based on a viewpoint which sense of beauty operates in aesthetic judgment, and its contents are relational properties like utility and convenience that is felt in both of subject and object. According to Hume, the beauty is an indefinable power in objects which causes a pleasurable sentiment, and beauty is not itself a sentiment, nor even a property discernible by the five senses, but rather a property whose presence is felt only when objects with certain detectable properties causally interact, under specifiable conditions, with minds having certain properties. In other words, aesthetic judgments express sentiments reflecting cognitive valuation just as much as universal moral judgments do not directly express desires or aversions, but rather feelings like sentiments of approval and disapproval. Hume's concept of sympathy is a basic principle which aesthetic judgments can accord with each other. His standards of taste show that the universal accords with aesthetic judgments between different people are practicable, differing from moral judgments having not universal accord of judgment in spite of possible correction of sympathy.

Citation status

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