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Second-person approach to Other Minds’ Problem and Philosophical Counselling

김효은 1

1이화여자대학교

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ABSTRACT

Other minds’ problem in philosophy of mind deals with the question of how we ascribe mental states to other persons, and how we use the states to explain and predict the actions of those other persons. Theory-theory and simulation theory, each of which is the third-person and the first-person families of theories of mind, have been developed for decades. This paper argues for an alternative, second-person account of mindreading. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I argue that Gallagher’s Interaction theory is a promising second-person account of others’ minds problem. Second, I argue that the interaction theory can be the theoretical basis of philosophical counselling. I specifically focus on the three stages of intersubjectivity in Gallagher’s Interaction theory. I argue that his theory explains broader range of symptoms of autism rather than theory-theory and simulation theory. Further, the false-belief task on which the two theories depends in evaluating others’ mindreading turns out to be an inadequate testbed. As part of showing the explanatory power of the interaction theory, I also argue that the three stages of intersubjectivity in Gallagher’s theory correspond to reciprocity, non-directiveness, critical thinking of philosophical counseling.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.

This paper was written with support from the National Research Foundation of Korea.