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@article{ART002109424},
author={Sung, Changwon},
title={The Agent - Relativity of Good - The Buck - Passing Account of Good - },
journal={Philosophical Investigation},
issn={1598-7213},
year={2016},
volume={42},
pages={139-168},
doi={10.33156/philos.2016.42..005}

TY - JOUR
AU - Sung, Changwon
TI - The Agent - Relativity of Good - The Buck - Passing Account of Good -
JO - Philosophical Investigation
PY - 2016
VL - 42
IS - null
PB - Institute of philosophy in Chung-Ang Univ.
SP - 139
EP - 168
SN - 1598-7213
AB - According to the Buck-Passing Account of good (the BPA) based on reasons fundamentalism, to say that something is good is to say that there is reason to respond to it in certain ways. Since the buck-passers reduce truths about values to truths about reasons for actions and attitudes, the underlying idea of the BPA is the priority of the normative over the evaluative. Wallace develops the BPA by introducing what he calls the deliberative model of values, according to which an object can have the property of being good only when there is a specific agent who has reason to respond to it in certain ways. In this way, the deliberative model is different from the non-deliberative model that does not require the agential response in question. Given that the proponents of the deliberative model may only endorse agent-relative good, they are distinguished from the Mooreans who accept the ontological priority of agent-neutral good over agent-relative good. I explain this major difference between these two positions by discussing Regan’s recent attempts to justify the “Moorean” good. Although the deliberative model is a promising attempt to understand the idea of good in an agent-relative way, it may be objected on the following two grounds. First, Wallace defends the advantage of the deliberative model by pointing out that we can have a better epistemological access to lower-properties of objects than to their higher-order properties. But I argue that this is not always true. Second, the deliberative model does not provide any standard by which we can distinguish between positive and negative normative judgments. For that matter, the deliberative model fails to accommodate our intuition that only the kind of positive normative judgments can warrant the property of being good. This also makes the model in question vulnerable to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Objection to the BPA.
KW - Good;Agent-Relativity of Good;Deliberative Model;Non-deliberative Model;Buck-Passing Account of Good;Normative Judgments
DO - 10.33156/philos.2016.42..005
ER -

Sung, Changwon. (2016). The Agent - Relativity of Good - The Buck - Passing Account of Good - . Philosophical Investigation, 42, 139-168.

Sung, Changwon. 2016, "The Agent - Relativity of Good - The Buck - Passing Account of Good - ", Philosophical Investigation, vol.42, pp.139-168. Available from: doi:10.33156/philos.2016.42..005

Sung, Changwon "The Agent - Relativity of Good - The Buck - Passing Account of Good - " Philosophical Investigation 42 pp.139-168 (2016) : 139.

Sung, Changwon. The Agent - Relativity of Good - The Buck - Passing Account of Good - . 2016; 42 139-168. Available from: doi:10.33156/philos.2016.42..005

Sung, Changwon. "The Agent - Relativity of Good - The Buck - Passing Account of Good - " Philosophical Investigation 42(2016) : 139-168.doi: 10.33156/philos.2016.42..005

Sung, Changwon. The Agent - Relativity of Good - The Buck - Passing Account of Good - . Philosophical Investigation, 42, 139-168. doi: 10.33156/philos.2016.42..005

Sung, Changwon. The Agent - Relativity of Good - The Buck - Passing Account of Good - . Philosophical Investigation. 2016; 42 139-168. doi: 10.33156/philos.2016.42..005

Sung, Changwon. The Agent - Relativity of Good - The Buck - Passing Account of Good - . 2016; 42 139-168. Available from: doi:10.33156/philos.2016.42..005

Sung, Changwon. "The Agent - Relativity of Good - The Buck - Passing Account of Good - " Philosophical Investigation 42(2016) : 139-168.doi: 10.33156/philos.2016.42..005