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Explanation, Moral Responsibility, and Incompatibilism

Jaeho Lee 1 Lee, Eunhong 1

1중앙대학교

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we argue that once we accept “dependence- explanation-moral responsibility thesis,” according to which the notion of counterfactual dependence, explanation and moral responsibility comprise a conceptual cluster and that of production does not belong to this cluster, it becomes much easier to defend incompatibilism concerning free will. We first argue that anybody who wants to defend incompatibilism needs to defend ‘source incompatibilism’ rather than ‘leeway incompatibilism.’ Then we argue that the most influential criticism against source incompatibilism, namely J.M. Fisher’s criticism, can be easily undermined once we accept dependence-explanation-moral responsibility thesis.

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* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.