2018, Vol., No.48

Social Movement and Local Elites in Cheonan Area under the Japanese Colonialism

PARK SANGJUN , Chang, Kyusik | 2018, (48) | pp.5~35 | number of Cited : 5

Xie Hui | 2018, (48) | pp.37~56 | number of Cited : 0

Taiwanese Intellectuals’ Recognition of Joseon(朝鮮) during Japanese Colonial Rule: Focusing on Members of the Taiwanese Cultural Association

Sungchan， Lee , Son Jun Sik | 2018, (48) | pp.57~99 | number of Cited : 3

PDF

The purpose of this study is to understand the recognition of Joseon expressed by Taiwanese intellectuals through magazines, newspaper articles, and diary analysis, focusing on members of the Taiwanese Cultural Association during the Japanese colonial period. The Taiwanese Cultural Association was founded in 1921 as a representative organization of Taiwanese intellectuals at that time. While promoting the movement to increase Taiwanese people’s rights in various spaces, it actively expressed its opinions on Táiwān Mínbào(『臺灣民報』). The Taiwanese consciousness distinguishes itself from the others by naming the people ‘Taiwanese’ and uses ‘Taiwan’ as the space of community. It was the result of the dissatisfaction with exploitation and national discrimination in the Japanese colonial period. As a result of modernization and assimilation policies, social mobility was enhanced and a common language emerged; all of this gradually began to form around Taiwanese students in Japan. The Taiwanese Cultural Association, founded by people with Taiwanese consciousness, aimed at reforming colonial rule such as establishing Taiwan’s parliament and local self-government assuming that political colonial rule was admitted. Therefore, they were sensitive to the situation and the change of government policies in Joseon, which was the same colony of Japan. To the intellectuals of Taiwan, Joseon was recognized as a companion who was in a similar situation under Japanese colonialism, working with Taiwan to have the right to be treated equally. The press of Joseon had also the same sense of identity. However, Taiwanese people’s interests were mainly concentrated on the issue of political rights and local autonomy, and Joseon was often regarded as a comparison for raising practicality. On the other hand, Taiwanese intellectuals referred to Joseon as a reference case to highlight the status of Taiwan in the Japanese empire and to make clear the reality that Taiwan is discriminated compared to Joseon. In other words, it emphasized the financial integrity of Taiwan and raised the issue of Taiwan’s press freedom and inequality, which was lower than that of Joseon. In summary, Taiwan demanded appropriate rights. However, when the news that the local autonomy reform plan would be implemented first came to Joseon in late 1929, the Taiwanese Cultural Association, which had been demanding autonomous reform for a lifetime, was shocked. So, they began to reveal their superiority to Joseon with a lot of conjecture and countermeasures. It seems that the idea that Taiwan was discriminated against compared to Joseon made Taiwanese intellectuals expressing the Chinese consciousness and aware them of Joseon as a competitor. This duplicity by the Taiwanese makes us think about the lessons of the irony of history in the sense that it has been repeated in the process of perception change in Korea since the Cold War.

Dijon and Talant : the enlargement of burgundy seigneurie

Jeong-Min Lee | 2018, (48) | pp.101~131 | number of Cited : 2

Modern China’s Foreign Debt in Railway Construction and Loss of Railway Rights

Kim Ji Hwan | 2018, (48) | pp.133~169 | number of Cited : 3

PDF

Studies on the pro-Japanese movement of Fan Han-sheng of consul-general of Seoul and Overseas Chinese Society in Korea during the Second Sino-Japanese War

YI JUNG HEE | 2018, (48) | pp.171~222 | number of Cited : 6

PDF

This paper aims to analyse pro-Japanese movement’s cause of Fan Han-sheng of consul-general of Seoul during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Fan Han-sheng visited the Japanese Government-General to expressed his will to participate in the Provisional Government of the Republic of China on December 17. After he proclaimed, he visited Beijing to obtain their approval to become a new government’s consul-general at Seoul from Wang Ke-min and Japanese Northern China Army. In spite of officers’ resist of Chinese Consulate General at Seoul, he forced to switch party flag and emblem of the Kuomintang to Five colored-Flags of new government with the assistance of Japanese military police headquarters in Korea. On December 29, after having successfully raised the Five-colored Flag, he ordered each consulate to raise the flag. Therefore, by January 4, 1938, all consulates raised the Five-colored Flag, in effect closing down all offices of Chiang Kai-shek’s National Government. When the raising of the Five-colored Flag was complete, he forced all the Chinese Chamber of Commerce around the nation to voice support for the provisional government, and beginning with Chinese Chamber of commerce in Seoul and Incheon, all of them are recorded as having announced their support be the end of January 1938. On February 3, 1938, He called a meeting of representatives of overseas Chinese organizations, summoning 22 heads of Chinese Chamber of Commerce from around the country, and organized the Federation of Chinese Chamber of Commerce Association in colonial Korea, the help realize the provisional government’s credo of ‘peace and anti-communism’. On the same day, he also held newly assigned consuls’ meeting. There are three factors in his turning to provisional government from Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist government. Firstly, he was opposed to Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-Japanese policy and procommunism. Secondly, he was willing to help their consuls and overseas Chinese in Korea. Thirdly, he made a judgement that he and his families’s life were not able to be guaranteed by Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist government.

Five-Years Achievements and Problems of ‘The Belt and Road Initiative’ Cultural Policy in China

Kwon Ki Young | 2018, (48) | pp.223~260 | number of Cited : 1

Over the past five years, China’s ‘The Belt and Road Initiative’ strategy has brought about diverse interpretations and controversy since the 2013 Xi Jinping brought up the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and ‘21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’ construction. There is positive public opinion and negative public opinion. Of course, the Chinese government also clearly recognizes that overcoming this negative public opinion is a key task in determining the success or failure of ‘The Belt and Road Initiative’. The Chinese government is extremely vigilant in recognizing ‘The Belt and Road Initiative’ along with Chinese expansionism or supremacy. For this reason, the Chinese government emphasizes the role of ‘People-to-people bond(民心相通)’ more than anything else. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the cultural policies and the progress of the Chinese government in relation to ‘The Belt and Road Initiative’ in the past five years, and to analyze its achievements and problems. The Chinese government’s foreign cultural policy aimed at countries along the Belt and Road is still focused on the direction of Chinese culture ‘Go global strategy(走出去)’. I think that if China continues this policy, it will be more difficult for the ‘People-to-people bond’. China’s foreign cultural policy in the 21st century was centered on two axes: cultural security and soft power. It is mainly in advanced countries, with strong regulatory policies on foreign cultural products and overseas expansion of Chinese culture. However, countries along the Belt and Road are mostly developing countries. Therefore, ‘one on one’ countries are also likely to look at China with the same perspective that China has for the advanced Western capitalist countries. From this point of view, China’s “The Belt and Road Initiative” cultural policy should be transformed dramatically in the future. If you want to borrow Chinese expression, the Chinese government should abandon its policy of ‘Go global strategy(走出去)’ Chinese culture abroad from a strategic point of view, and to focus on ‘Bring in (引進來)’ foreign culture into China. The Chinese government is not trying to force China to spread its values and to empathize with countries along the Belt and Road. Instead, it is trying to create a new era spirit in the process of actively experiencing and consuming the culture of countries along the Belt and Road.

KJCKorea
Journal Central

중앙사론 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.76

2018, Vol., No.48