2007, Vol., No.63

military history 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.94

pISSN : 1598-317X / eISSN : 2713-8992
https://journal.kci.go.kr/imhc

This article aims to explain about the war policy, objective, and conduct of war by President Syngman Rhee during the Korean War. The Korean War was the most difficult and potentially the most disastrous of the early Cold War period, a conflict which directly involved one of superpowers in open war with the most populous state in the world. The other superpower was only indirectly involved but there was always the possibility that it might intervene; the Third World War could erupt. This study has tried answer the following key questions: (1) What was President Syngman Rhee’s strategy toward the United States prior to the Korean War? (2) How did President Syngman Rhee act the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) surprise attack against the ROK? (3) What was war policy and objective of President Syngman Rhee? (4) When and Why did President Syngman Rhee try to penetrate the 38th parallel? (5) Why did President Syngman Rhee involve the United States into the Korean War? (6) What was role of President Syngman Rhee during the Korean War? (7) What did President Syngman Rhee obtain from the United States after the armistice? In seeking answers to the above questions in this paper, Foreign Relations of the United States by the US Department of State, Documents and Files of the ROK Government, the Korean War History by Ministry of National Defense of the ROK were used, and the Memoirs of those officers and generals who played an active part in policy-making were consulted also. In conclusion, President Syngman Rhee achieved an enforcement of the ROK Armed Forces and the ROK-US alliance relations through the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

When Russian archives were widely open and Chinese documents had been already published on the late 1990’s, a hot debate on the Chinese Entry into the Korean War was opened. The discrepancy was revealed between the Russian and Chinese version of Mao’s 2 October 1950 message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War. While Mao made a decision not to send any troops then in the Russian version, he said Stalin to make a decision to send 12 divisions on 15 October in Chinese version. Mao’s handwriting message which exists at the Chinese Communist Party Central Archives was not sent. Mao verbally delivered the reluctant message on entry into the Korean War to Roshchin and authorized the Soviet Ambassador to convey it to Stalin. Due to direct confrontation with the United States, the Soviet Union and China were originally reluctant to enter the Korean War. After Stalin discussed China's entry into war with Zhou Enlai from on 9 October, they agreed on the evacuation of North Korea and the retreat of Korean troops to the Northeast China. As Mao Zedong believed that the US control of entire Korea would pose a threat to China, he became less reluctant than Stalin. Mao's hesitation partially came from his calculation to receive more military help from Soviet Union such as air umbrella. Despite Stalin’s reluctance, Mao made the final decision to enter the Korean War on 13 October 1950. Had China not intervened in the Korean War, Mao would have lost an opportunity to assume a leadership role in Asian revolutionary movement.

This paper is the study on Kim-gie's argument about the expedition of the north in Hwang-saeng-jeon(黃生傳). This study inquired into Kim-gie's argument to conquer the north as two conditions. The first is the aspects and the characteristics of argument to conquer the North in Hwang-saeng-jeon(黃生傳) as two conditions. The second is the meanings and significances that argument to conquer the North in Hwang-saeng-jeon(黃生傳) occupies in the 18th discussion about the national defense.