2011, Vol., No.78

Marine Defence and Military Working of the Cheonghae Garrison

Shin, Seongjae | 2011, (78) | pp.1~31 | number of Cited : 5

PDF

During the reign of King Heungdeok, Silla had established Cheonghae Garrison in order to eliminate pirates that ran rampant in the southwestern seas of the Korean Peninsula. Since the garrison was previously regarded as maritime military barracks, its component was also strongly thought to be a naval force. However, Cheonghae Forces were not solely comprised of the navy. During the period between 838 and 839, the very existence of 3,000 cavalry out of 5000, that displayed superb abilities by defeating the Silla Government Army of 100,000 strong at the battle of Muju and Daegu, clearly demonstrate such fact. In fact, Cheonghae garrison was the military unit that was organized with not only the navy, but also cavalry and infantry as well. Such characteristics stemmed from the need to efficiently combat the threats of pirates which marauded on both land and sea. Especially, the pirates active during this period operated in a cohesive manner, connecting the sea, islands, coasts and inland based on their dominant powers. It was the time when the scale of piracy reached its peak, so that the forces of the Cheonghae Garrison had to be organized accordingly. It was this very reason which made King Heungdeok assign 10,000 men to the garrison. This force was presumably made up of elite soldiers awarded by the king at the time of Cheonghae establishment, regional soldiers who belonged to fortresses and garrisons of the west coast but were restructured by the king to give commanding powers to Jang Boko, and inhabitants of the frontier regions nearby Wando Island. The maritime activities of Cheonghae Garrison soldiers were basically conducted on the differentiation of military units. Navy was fully responsible to oust the pirates at sea, while cavalry and infantry were to rout the pirates inland. Despite such division of roles, tradition endured as the units took multiple functions in terms of guarding the seas. This was because there was no independent command system of the navy at the time, battle method also was similar to land battles, and of the fact that the weaponry system did not develop significantly. Consequently, duties and roles of different military units were bound to be operated flexibly. The very fact that the Silla Navy was underdeveloped in respect to system, strategy and tactics, and arms partly explains the essential composition of cavalry and infantry as a majority of Cheonghae Garrison's military organization, which was initially constructed for the purpose of maritime defence.

A Study on the Sea Battle of Noryang and the Circumstances around Yi Sun-sin's Death

Je, Jahng-Myung | 2011, (78) | pp.33~70 | number of Cited : 3

PDF

This paper points out the meaning of the Sea Battle of Noryang further, therefore, it is aimed for the raw circumstances of admiral, Yi Sun-sin who had lead the battle to defeat and the very moment passing away at the battle. This is because while the sea battle of Noryang has yet to be generally estimated, there are hypotheses scattered out about Yi Sun-sin's death. It has been asked a proper time to clear up the reality of admiral, Yi Sun-sin's death and the sea battle of Noryang. The purpose and the intentions of this paper would be summarized as below. First, the sea battle of Noryang was the only Joseon and Ming Combined Forces Operations during the Imjin War. Hence, it was the most significant issue to have capable directions of the Ming commander, Chen Lin who operated the rein. Yi Sun-sin derived the Ming Navy which were lead by Chen Lin to the battle with his excellent leadership. Furthermore, what he had credited by Chen Lin with building Yi's willingly cooperated manners resulted the Sea Battle of Noryang a complete victory. Yi Sun-sin's brilliant tactics and strategy were one of the reasons for the success on the Sea Battle of Noryang. For instance, his superlative strategy to settle on a prior occupation and to entice the Japanese Forces to Noryang Strait were an extraordinary strategy of the victory. In addition, this victory of the battle meant a lot to let the neighbor countries know the superlative of the Joseon Naval Force, of course dismissing the Japanese Forces which attacked the Joseon. The image toward Joseon of Ming turned to be amenable in the meantime. Furthermore, this victory of the battle gave ordinary citizens who were slumping down consoled a lot as well. Yi Sun-sin died at the sea battle of Noryang meant so much. I have analysed the surroundings of Yi Sun-sin's death; the sea and the time of Yi's death, the situation of the shooting, and who reinforced after the death. According to the research, Yi Sun-sin's death area could be considered nearby the way in Gwaneumpo, and the time of death is highly regarded at dawn. A stray bullet by one of Japanese Forces had struck him high on the left side of his heart and eventually pierced it, and it is certain that Yi had been wearing an armor. By the time it is skeptical that he was committed suicide but he was shut bounding up himself unintentionally. The captain, Song Hui-rip who had been at the flag ship took over maintaining Yi Sun-sin's death and assured the command during the battle being waged. The cooperations with Ming leaders were on Son Mun-wuk in the meantime.

The Characteristics of Soldier Martial Arts to Battle Formation Weonangjin(Mandarin Duck Battle Formation) in the Later Period of the Joseon Dynasty

Choi hyeong guk | 2011, (78) | pp.71~107 | number of Cited : 9

PDF

The Korean War and Nuclear Weapon Policy of the USA - The Focus in the Eisenhower Years -

이종판 | 2011, (78) | pp.109~127 | number of Cited : 4

PDF

There some reasons why the nuclear weapons were not used in the Korean War(1950~1953). First, the nuclear strategy is not established in the situation of the limited war. Second, the atomic bomb was the weapon for strategic attack which aimed at industrial targets or traffic centers. There were not that kind of targets during the Korean War. In other words, Chinese Communist Forces whose attack exploits mountains was not the target of atomic bombing. In addition, after the atomic bomb dropping on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, using the nuclear weapon again on Asia itself was banned. Third, if the expected effect does not appear despite using the atomic bomb, it was concerned that the control function might disappear. The problems about nuclear weapon's control function were already unveiled. Bernard Brodie, one of the American nuclear strategy creator, mentioned the hardship of control in the nuclear world: “Today's weird paradox is that, though the nuclear must operate its control function, the concern about the malfunctioning of it is inherent." The nuclear threat tried by Eisenhower and Dulles was elementary but throws lots of meaning. In retrospect, Eisenhower and Dulles conceive new strategy during the presidential race in 1952, criticizing Truman's strategy. It was that American must prepare for exploiting nuclear weapons by using dominant position on nuclear when necessary. Here, the claim that psychological barrier between nuclear weapons and others should be overcome was brought forward. Eisenhower did not entirely agree on Dulles' viewpoint regarding the nuclear during the election campaign but after inauguration accepted his opinion to finish the Korean War and when faced the problem to maintain the Armistice Agreement. Nuclear threat for extracting the Armistice Agreement by American will, and nuclear threat in case of being unsolved as planned were more evident. And it is continued after the Armistice Agreement. Like this, Eisenhower and Dulles thought nuclear threat was success. Based on this, the cold war strategy under Eisenhower regime downsized old weapons and relied on nuclear weapon control. The perspective that the nuclear threat strategy was successful in terms of deriving the Armistice Agreement of the Korean War is based on misunderstanding of Eisenhower and Dulles. However, the nuclear policy formed from such misunderstanding is developed into the policy that decided the victory by nuclear weapons in a series of crisis in 1950's Asia.

A Study on the North Korean Peoples Army's Crossing Operation s in the Yeoungsan Battle

Sungjin Jang | 2011, (78) | pp.129~167 | number of Cited : 4

PDF

The North Korean Peoples Army(NKPA) accepted and translated the Soviet Military Doctrine before the Korean War(1950~1953), and so the Soviet Military Doctrine affected the North Korea way of the battle. Particularly the “Crossing Operations" doctrine is an important matter because of the configuration of the Korea ground-Han River, Geum River and Nakdong River. And so the North Korea recognize the fact that crossing operations were important but they didn't have sufficient troops and equipment for this operations. But NKPA executed the crossing operation at early combat in Korean War by the military doctrine, NKPA's FM “Crossing Operations". Therefore this study show that how the military doctrine executed in the Nakdong Bulge Battle. The river crossing operations classify into two groups, elaborate- crossing and prompt-crossing operations. The Nakdong Bulge Battle at the NKPA's August Offensive was not elaborate-crossing, but prompt-crossing operations. The NK 4th Division could secure a bridgehead by surprise attack through the crossing Nakdong River in secret. But they didn't extend the bridgehead. At first reason is that they delayed the heavy equipment(like as tank and artillery) crossing operations because that they did not have equipment for this operations. The Second is that decision of Walker and counterattack of the Marine Brigade. The Nakdong Bulge Battle at NKPA's September Offensive was elaborate- crossing operations. They did make a thorough preparation the crossing operations for success. For example, they prepared the underwater bridge, raft bridge, personal equipment and others. Particularly their patrol get information about the enemy’s movements. Through this preparation of crossing operations and patrol, the NK 2nd and 9th Divisions also could secure a bridgehead. They could clear obstacles like enemy's tank and an artilleryman, separate US 2nd Division, and cross the heavy equipment. But NKPA didn't extend the bridgehead. The first reason is that their concept of the crossing operations was only division grade operations, not corps grade operations. If September Offensive was corps grade operation, they had hold the succeed division and so could gain a decisive victory at the Nakdong bulge. But they didn't. The secondary reason is that decision of Walker and counterattack of the Marine brigade.

A Study on the Self-Reliant Defense Policy of the ROK in the 1970s

박봉수 | 2011, (78) | pp.169~203 | number of Cited : 3

PDF

A Study on the Park Chung Hee Administration's Defense Diplomacy

이재학 | 2011, (78) | pp.205~234 | number of Cited : 1

PDF

This paper has two purposes. First one is to compare the concept of the Park Administration's defense diplomacy with the concept of the defense diplomacy in the post-Cold War era. Second one is to analyse and evaluate the strategy and results of the Park Chung Hee Administration's defense diplomacy. As the importance of defense diplomacy increased in the post-Cold War era, the Republic of Korea(ROK) decided to officially use “defense diplomacy" instead of “military diplomacy" in the Defense White Paper 2008. However, it was not the first time that the ROK used it in the Defense White Paper. Park Chung Hee Administration already used “defense diplomacy" in the Defense White Paper 1968. The conclusion is that the Park Administration considered defense diplomacy as one of means to pursue national security aim under the unstable security environment in the late 1960s. In addition, the Park Administration established the foundation for defense diplomacy by focusing on military relations, military assistances and defense industries, and international conflicts management. The administration also could achieved substantial results such as the institutionalization of the ROK-US Combined Defense System, the US Military Assistance, the ROK Military Modernization, the ROK-US Combined Military Exercises, International Support, and so on. In the late 1960s, the Park administration recognized that changes were in the air in the security environment around the Korea Peninsular. First, on July 26, 1969, President Nixon released a statement on Guam which became known as the Nixon Doctrine. The President states that future US policy in Asia would seek to avoid military intervention and initiated the first US Forces withdrawal. Second, military threats from the North Korea (NK) increased as the NK made consecutive military provocations and built up it's military power. The ROK had to increase military power against growing the NK threats, but it did not have enough international aids as well as national power. Considering all these situations, the Park had no other way than to strategically made the best use of the given situations and means. Defense Diplomacy was one of the strategic means to overcome this unstable security environment. The Park administration's defense diplomacy could be analyzed by the three strategic characteristics of defense diplomacy in the post-Cold War era. First, it focused on achieving national security aims such as anticommunism and development. The aims of defense diplomacy were establishing anticommunism network, building up self-defense capability, active defense diplomacy. All part of the administration such as president, prime minister, ministry of defense and so on cooperated to make use of the given situation and means to achieve the three aims. Second, it contributed to improve security situation and the ROK international status by carrying out various non-violent military activities during peace time. As a result, the Park Administration could institutionalize the ROK-US Military Alliance. For instance, after the NK provocations in 1968, the ROK-US Annual Defense Meeting was held. Following the fourth meeting in 1971, the title was changed to the “ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting(SCM)" and evolved into a Multi-dimensional Security Meeting. At the tenth SCM, two sides agreed upon establishing the ROK-US Combined Forces Command(CFC). In addition, the US reaffirmed its commitment to the security of the ROK by providing military assistance and helping the ROK's Force Modernization Plan(1971~1975). Third, it tried to broaden bilateral and multilateral relationships to supplement the ROK military power against the NK threats. For example, the Park administration tried to reaffirmed security commitment from the 16 UN Allies which participated in Korean War. Furthermore, the ROK Armed Forces in Vietnam War conducted not only military operations not also civil-military operations such as building 172 bridges, paving 35,535 km road, and so on. All these activities and results contributed to implement national security aims as well as defense diplomacy aims. Despite these achievements, the Park administration's defense diplomacy had limits to sufficiently accomplish the aims. First, compared with the ROK-US relationship, defense diplomacy with other bilateral and multilateral relations did not have many achievement. Second, some of the achievements on the ROK-US relations also had some limitations. For instance, the US fulfilled only 45% in 1972 and 54% in 1973 of its aid commitment on the ROK's Force Modernization Plan. However, considering the given situations such as weak the ROK national power, increasing the NK threats, and Nixon doctrine, the Park Administration did not have many strategic alternatives. In 2010, the ROK again faces military tensions on Korea Peninsular. The Park Administration's active defense diplomacy provides couple of implication today. First, the government has to set clear and detailed security aims and strategy to change current unstable security environment into favorable condition to the ROK. Second, the ROK should put wisdom together to make the best use of the given situation such as different positions on the NK provocations among neighbor countries. Third, the government needs to carry out active defense diplomacy based on understanding our strategic characteristics such as national power, geopolitical position, changing security environment.

The Strategies and Tactics of the War of Resistance of the Nationalist Army during the First Phase of the Sino-Japanese War Revisited, 1937~1938

기세찬 | 2011, (78) | pp.235~279 | number of Cited : 0

PDF

Through the analysis of the defensive strategy in the early stage of the war, this study epitomize the strategic goal of the chief officers and operation types in each campaign. First, it examined how the Nationalist Army reacted as it confronted the threats of the Japanese since Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Then it analyzed the military operations of the Nationalist Army before-and-after the surrender of Nanjing. First of all, this study focused on the dissidence of Song Zheyuan and Chiang Kaishek, the chief commanders in Nanjing headquarters. Although Chiang Kaishek did not at disregard the opportunity of the negotiation against Japan, he noticed the possibility of the all-out-war against Japan in the early stage of the Incident and therefore initiated military measures by deploying some of the Central Army to the North China. Meanwhile, Song Zheyuan actively negotiated with the Japanese by taking a real time pact. This discordant between the chief commanders in the headquarters and the providence allowed the time for the Japanese to dispatch additional military corps from Korea to North China, and therefore provided Japan took the initiative in the North China area in the early stage of the war. Japan took dominating all-out-war in North China and at the same time attacked Shanghai in order to pressure the Nationalist Army from the both side of the south and the north. The Nationalist’s Supreme command decided 1st War Zone to be the main defensive line in order to prolonged war, but as he realized that the Japanese increased additional force to East China, he concentrated the Central Army and reserve to East China, which were originally commanded to deploy to North China. Regarding the change of the strategy of the Nationalist Army, some researchers declare that Chiang Kaishek was trying to battle against Japan with a desperate defense. However as mentioned earlier, Chiang Kaishek did not believe that the Nationalist Army was strong enough to defeat the Japanese in Shanghai. The true goal of concentrating forces in Shanghai was to diminish the pressure in North China and therefore to commence operations in the inner defensive lines later. This was the prolonged strategy contrast to the Japanese’s quick war. Regarding the overall military progressions, the deployment of the Nationalist Army in North China and East China is considered defensive operation, but there is definite difference in terms of the strategic concept. In fact, while the Nationalist army initiated the defence in the front step-by-step, it took offensive defense in East China. However, the Nationalist Army did not fail to confirm any errors in the military operations. In North China, the Nationalist Army should have operated decisive maneuvers at the depth of the coordinated defensive lines, but it actually committed decisive attack at each battle field. In addition, during the defensive operation in Shanghai, the Nationalist Army centralized the force in a limited area, which caused enormous damage from the enemy’s concentrated-fires. It also concentrated the force only in Shanghai, and thus fail to prepare against Japanese’s Hangzhou Bay landing operation. Meanwhile, as the war progressed slowly after the fall of Nanjing till the march of the 1938, the Nationalist’s supreme command tried to improve the military morale by punishing the officers with slackened discipline, and reorganized the troops with the new alteration of the operational tactics. In order to defense Wuhan, the Nationalist Army ordered to deploy their forces against the Japanese with the purpose of delaying the war, and applied a concept of offensive defense and guerilla tactics in addition to the regular operations. Hence, after the fall of Nanjing, the operation type of the Nationalist Army altered from ‘the defensive’ to ‘the delaying.’According to the new operational tactics, the Nationalist Army incremented the force of the 5th War Zone to dissipate the power of the Japanese while earning the time to prepare Wuhan by leading the main power of the Japanese to Xuzhou. Before the operation Xuzhou, the Nationalist Army gained its first victory over Japan at Taierzhuang. The main factors of the victory were derived from taking the offensive attack instead of posing the defensive attitude and also from the troop’s great desire for victory under the command of Chiang Kaishek to Tang Enbo, and Li Zongren. After the battle of Taierzhuang, the Japanese realized the existence of the Chinese force in Xuzhou and therefore implemented a comprehensive encirclement annihilation operations. The Nationalist Army tried to initiate the offensive-defense through the inner defensive line, but the Japanese sieged Xuzhou earlier than expected and hence the operation failed. However, as it delayed Japan in Xuzhou, the Nationalist Army indeed succeeded to earn time for Wuhan defense, and in the end achieved to delay the Japanese in Wuhan for the next two months. Overall, until the end of the 1938 Japan succeeded to triumph over most of the battles with the intensive fire and quick maneuver, and occupied most of the cities along the south-east of the China. However, it failed to achieve to the definite goal of surrendering or annihilating the Chinese troops through the decisive attacks. In conclusion, it represents the failure of the Japanese’s quick war, which implies the success of most of military tactics of the Nationalist Army. Although the damage was immense through the war for a year and five months, the Nationalist Army in fact succeeded to delay the Japanese attack, leading a war to the prolonged. However, as researchers from Taiwan indicates, the military tactics of the Nationalist Army was not intended to lead the Japanese force, which were heading from the north to the south, toward the west from the east for the benefits of the Chinese. The shift of the military strategy from the defensive operation to the delaying operation after the fall of Nanjing was considered to be inevitable due to the consecutive defeats of the Nationalist Army in North China and East China in the early stage of the war.

KJCKorea
Journal Central

military history 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.94

2011, Vol., No.78