2015, Vol., No.95

Reargument of Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command : the Background and Process of Establishment

Sangmun Suh | 2015, (95) | pp.1~54 | number of Cited : 4

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This research has found that it is probable that Beijing had demanded Pyeongyang to accept the military and political terms which were necessary to serve the war before sending its troops. Although the terms which Beijing suggested to Pyeongyang before dispatching troops were inevitable requirements to ensure its victory of war, the terms contained some factors that would limit military and political authority of Kim Il-sung, and eventually sovereignty of North Korea. The response of Kim Il-Sung at first was refusal. It was not surprising to see him refusing China's requirements because accepting them meant the higher possibility of political downfall of Kim Il-Sung himself and infringement of national sovereignty and military control. Despite Pyeongyang's refusing to accept the terms, Mao Zedong(毛澤東) had constantly delivered his message to Pyeongyang, at least five times, to combine China and North Korea military commands through various communication routes, after the Chinese People's Volunteer Army(PVA) entered North Korea from late October to late November. Mao's suggestion meant the coercive pressure imposed on Kim to accept the terms. However, Kim had no intention to build an alliance between the troops. As such, Kim merely responded to Mao that the two troops will conduct operations under each command and cooperate with each other if needed. Because Kim constantly denied the alliance, Mao tactically used Stalin's authority to make Kim, Shtikov, a Soviet ambassador to North Korea, and Soviet military advisers agree on the unity of command between China and North Korea. Stalin recognized China’s long-term war strategy for his strategic intention which contains a goal of continual power consumption of China and U.S. in the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, Stalin accepted Mao’s request which was to make Kim and Soviet advisers agree on the alliance and then he summoned the ambassador and military advisers to North Korea to make them take the responsibility of the failure of North Korea's invasion to South Korea. Kim, who had not even moved by Gao Gang(高崗) sent by Mao, agreed on the alliance because of the supports and pressure from Stalin who had started to trust Kim just then. Kim had finally begun to cooperate to Mao after achieving supports from Stalin, which led to establish the Sino-North Korea combined forces command; before then, Kim had distrusted Beijing due to his fear to be deprived of his power. It means that Stalin’s support was prior to that of Mao for Kim. Meanwhile, it can be evaluated that China accomplished its original purpose by strategically using Kim's surrounding situational vulnerability, although the original terms had to go through a few modifications. In conclusion, the Sino-North Korea combined forces command was a result of political compromise between Kim Il-sung and Mao Zedong to achieve their own respective interests.

The Agenda on the Withdrawal of Foreign Troops suggested in Geneva Political Conference held in 1954

Boyoung Kim | 2015, (95) | pp.55~88 | number of Cited : 6

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The purpose of this paper is to research the meaning and the background on the issue of withdrawal of foreign troops raised as a major political issue in Geneva Conference in 1954. Armistice Agreement Clause 4, Article 60, which dealt with political talks, was based on consent of two sides, the UN forces and Communists, which had a conflict over the withdrawal of foreign troops but agreed to discuss the issue after the cease-fire. According to the article of the Armistice Agreement, the main agendas of political conferences should be ‘the peaceful settlement of the Korean matter’ and ‘the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula.’ The issue of the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Korean peninsular was strongly raised by the communists in the Truce Talks. They claimed the issue as a necessary condition to guarantee the cease-fire, but the UN Forces regarded the issue as a political matter and avoided discussing it. Besides, the UN forces opposed the withdrawal of foreign troops. After adapted as the 5th agenda in the Armistice Agreement, the matter of the withdrawal of foreign troops became one of the agendas in a post-war political conference. However, it became weakened by the UN’s claim that the agenda about the political conference should be regarded only as much as a degree of ‘suggestion.’ Meanwhile, a preliminary conference took place in Panmunjom directly after the cease-fire, on October 26, 1953. However, the United States suspended the preliminary conference unilaterally for an issue of prisoners, and it broke down without any consent. Later on, a political conference was held during 1954 Geneva Conference under an agreement between the great powers. A total of 19 countries participated in the conference such as South and North Korea, China and Soviet Union including 15 partaking combatant nations of UN except the Republic of South Africa, The main agenda of the conference was a measure of the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, and there had been two controversies over the matters of the withdrawal of foreign troops and a status of UN. The both sides all insisted the peaceful unification by election. However, they had differences on the way to hold on an election and the way to monitor it. With regard to the matter of the withdrawal of foreign troops, the UN forces contended that Chinese forces, the invading army, should withdraw first. In contrast, Communists insisted that all foreign troops should be disengaged simultaneously. Geneva Conference of 1954 ended up breaking down on account of these differences, and the settlement of the Korean question was transferred to UN. The talks might be regarded as an attempt to settle the issues through negotiation. However, there was no room to negotiate and no legal entities of the agreement. That was the reason why a willingness to compromise and an effort to settle the problems of both sides were required. However, both sides did not show any of them, so it was foreseen to fail in the peaceful settlement of the Korean matter through an agreement. It led to not only Korea-U.S. Alliance, the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement and US forces stationing in South Korea, but also Chinese People’s Volunteers remaining, Sino-DPRK Alliance in North Korea and DPRK-Soviet Alliance in North Korea. In conclusion, ‘the peaceful settlement of the Korean matter’, a purpose of the political conference, did not imply ‘the unification’ but ‘peaceful governance.’ of Korean peninsular

A Study on Transfomation of ROK National Defense Policy focused on National Defense Objective

Misook Lee | 2015, (95) | pp.89~140 | number of Cited : 9

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This article is based on ‘national defense objective’, analyzed the transitional process ROK national defense policies. National defense objective is to acquire one through national defense policies and it is also the evaluation criteria and guidelines of implementation of the policies. It was set up on Dec. 29th, 1972 for the national objective in 1970, it did explicit direction of policy and military strategy. In the 1980s, it had revised one with full scale for the go-it-alone defense posture (1st revision). It was amended secondly on March 10th, 1994 for the unification and the post-Cold War situation. ROK national defense policy transformation processes classified national defense objective by the period are as follows ; (1) The national defense policies foundation period before the establishment of national defense objective (2) The national defense policies establishment period after the enactment of national defense objective (1972,12,28) (3) The national defense policies transition period after the first reformation national defense objective (1981,11,28) (4) The national defense policies reformation period after the second revision of national defense objective (1994, 3, 10) Like this, national defense policy had been fulfilled in accordance with each period security situation and self-reliance defense capability for objective, but it contains shortfalls. That result is based on the effectiveness of policy evaluation without properness as maintenance of the status quo level. This means contributed to somewhat acquiring goal, did not fulfill policy goal. This one is insufficient active role for the favorable change inducement or environment, just against North Korea threat and security environment changing. For the sufficiently acquiring goal, the policy has to approach with properness of content and establishment/revision, consistency, correlation between objective and policy, and efficiency of national defense plan

A Study on the Path and Process of the Alliance Transformation and Security Strategy Change in the Post-Soviet Transition Period of East Europe: A Comparative Analysis between the case of Ukraine and Czech Republic

Baek, Jun Kee | 2015, (95) | pp.141~183 | number of Cited : 0

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The purpose of this research is to evaluate 'factors and process' of foreign security policy change and military strategy transformation among the East European nations in the transition period of ‘the post-Cold War’ and to take its implications for Korean reunification process. To do that, this research has selected two countries(Czech Republic and Ukraine) among them, and analysed the two nation's transition of strategy. In view of their population and national capacity, Czech Republic and Ukraine have middle powers, and in geopolitical aspects they play strategic-pivot roles in the great powers. These two nations have similarity to South and North Korea, considering relative capacities and geopolitical conditions. This research not only takes a realistic approach which highlights the 'Balance of Power', but also takes a constructive approach which focuses on 'the political perception and ideational factors' of political elites. EU which is a politico-economic alliance and NATO which is an European collective regime and a typical military alliance were selected as research objects. On the background of Czech and Ukraine's alliance transformation have worked geopolitical factors, 'geocultural identity' and historical experiences of the rules of the great powers. Most of East European countries have naturally chosen a transformation strategy which implicated joining NATO and EU by dissolving the Warsaw Treaty Organization and COMECON in order to integrate themselves with the Atlantic alliance system and Western Europe. The purpose of this research is to evaluate 'factors and process' of foreign security policy change and military strategy transformation among the East European nations in the transition period of ‘the post-Cold War’ and to take its implications for Korean reunification process. To do that, this research has selected two countries(Czech Republic and Ukraine) among them, and analysed the two nation's transition of strategy. In view of their population and national capacity, Czech Republic and Ukraine have middle powers, and in geopolitical aspects they play strategic-pivot roles in the great powers. These two nations have similarity to South and North Korea, considering relative capacities and geopolitical conditions. This research not only takes a realistic approach which highlights the 'Balance of Power', but also takes a constructive approach which focuses on 'the political perception and ideational factors' of political elites. EU which is a politico-economic alliance and NATO which is an European collective regime and a typical military alliance were selected as research objects. On the background of Czech and Ukraine's alliance transformation have worked geopolitical factors, 'geocultural identity' and historical experiences of the rules of the great powers. Most of East European countries have naturally chosen a transformation strategy which implicated joining NATO and EU by dissolving the Warsaw Treaty Organization and COMECON in order to integrate themselves with the Atlantic alliance system and Western Europe. In regional policy and alliance strategy, Czech’ political elites have decided to ‘return to Europe.’ The Czech’s ‘Euro-oriented geocultural identity’ has exerted influences on their policy-making. In comparison to Ukraine, Czech stood relatively aloof from Russia’s geopolitical influences, therefore, Czech’s elites could decide to take ‘the Western path’ more easily than those of Ukraine. For Ukraine, in view of foreign security policy and alliance transformation policy, Russia’s geopolitical influence is a main and the most critical factor of policy-making. In a geocultural aspect, unlike Czech which has a strong tradition of Europeanism, European orientation is confused with Russian orientation in Ukraine. Its cultural hybridism makes discordance with the ‘Western path’ and ‘Russian path’ in the process of making decision. The geopolitical, geocultural, and historical experiences of Czech and Ukraine suggest not a few policy implications to Korean reunification process. First of all, it would not be easy for us to secure strategic autonomy from political influences of China and Russia if the issue of alliance transformation will be raised in the reunification process. Secondly, it is necessary to indicate that we have to hold a introspection on geopolitical identity. Like East European cases, the geocultural identity of Korea plays an important role in the process of Korean reunification. Lastly, with reference to East European cases, the five strategic options (as realistic alternatives) could be set up as below: ① Maintenance and consolidation plan of the ROK-US alliance; ② Dissolution of the existing alliance regime(ROK-US-Japan vs China-Russia-North Korea) and establishment of the common security regime in Northeast Asia or East Asia; ③ Coexistence of the ROK-US alliance within a common security regime of Northeast Asia; ④ Transformation of the ROK-US alliance to the nonmilitary political alliance; ⑤ Non-alliance neutralization. The relatively autonomous space for those options would be constituted if we could rationally mobilize our strategic resources by considering domestic political conditions and international political environments in the process of Korean reunification. In regional policy and alliance strategy, Czech’ political elites have decided to ‘return to Europe.’ The Czech’s ‘Euro-oriented geocultural identity’ has exerted influences on their policy-making. In comparison to Ukraine, Czech stood relatively aloof from Russia’s geopolitical influences, therefore, Czech’s elites could decide to take ‘the Western path’ more easily than those of Ukraine. For Ukraine, in view of foreign security policy and alliance transformation policy, Russia’s geopolitical influence is a main and the most critical factor of policy-making. In a geocultural aspect, unlike Czech which has a strong tradition of Europeanism, European orientation is confused with Russian orientation in Ukraine. Its cultural hybridism makes discordance with the ‘Western path’ and ‘Russian path’ in the process of making decision. The geopolitical, geocultural, and historical experiences of Czech and Ukraine suggest not a few policy implications to Korean reunification process. First of all, it would not be easy for us to secure strategic autonomy from political influences of China and Russia if the issue of alliance transformation will be raised in the reunification process. Secondly, it is necessary to indicate that we have to hold a introspection on geopolitical identity. Like East European cases, the geocultural identity of Korea plays an important role in the process of Korean reunification. Lastly, with reference to East European cases, the five strategic options (as realistic alternatives) could be set up as below: ① Maintenance and consolidation plan of the ROK-US alliance; ② Dissolution of the existing alliance regime(ROK-US-Japan vs China-Russia-North Korea) and establishment of the common security regime in Northeast Asia or East Asia; ③ Coexistence of the ROK-US alliance within a common security regime of Northeast Asia; ④ Transformation of the ROK-US alliance to the nonmilitary political alliance; ⑤ Non-alliance neutralization. The relatively autonomous space for those options would be constituted if we could rationally mobilize our strategic resources by considering domestic political conditions and international political environments in the process of Korean reunification.

How to understand Book I. Chapter 1 of On War(written by Carl von Clausewitz)

Kim Tae Hyun | 2015, (95) | pp.185~230 | number of Cited : 5

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The purpose of this study is to explain the logical structure of 'nature of war' in the Book I, Chapter 1 of On War written by Carl von Clausewitz, as an introduction for beginners who are going to study On War. This article does not try to take a critical approach about the previous literature, but try to give a contribution to help readers to understand this great book just more clearly and easily. As a result this article is trying to provide a profound basis for interpretation about the 'nature of war' on a deeper and reliable basis. This study follows two different approaches. First, this article was built on a interaction between a empirical 'history' and a conceptual 'theory'. On war is a classic literature about political science and military art and science whose main empirical case was about conducting of Napoleonic Wars in the 19th century. Accordingly, we need to analyze three main campaigns in the Napoleonic Wars in order to answer key questions raised in this book. In this background, I will introduce 'three campaigns' and 'two different types of war' conceptualized by the German scholar Andreas Herberg-rothe. Three campaigns include Jena/Auerstedt(1806), Moscow(1812), Waterloo(1815) and two types of war are consisted of a 'absolute war(Entgrenzung der Gewalt)' and 'real war(Begrenzung der Gewalt)'. Second, this article needs a closer look at a new architecture of the interaction between ‘the whole’ and ‘the part’ of On War which was proposed by Carl von Clausewitz himself. The author intended to provide a simple and systematic logic about the nature of war. He does not want to bring readers a confusion by letting various pieces of elements belonged to war untouched or unorganized one. This means, Clausewitz's efforts to analyze the campaigns from part to part needed to be integrated into a single work or a ‘one final product’ under the framework with ‘one perspective’ or ‘one single point of view’. The different perspective and changing character on three campaigns are kinds like a confused mixture, because this was published as a unfinished literature after Clausewitz died. Therefore, we have to study the whole publication process during twenty years. Finally, this study comes to a conclusion that Book I Chapter 1 of is a framework for the following whole part of On War. The main theme Clausewitz raised during twenty years was the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation of war(‘entgrenzung’ and ‘begrenzung’). Clausewitz intended to clarify why war comes to anescalation⟶mitigation⟶de-escalaton⟶suspension.The methodology used in this book to illuminate the cause of this question was the dialectical approach using the opposite concept of ‘ideal world and real world’, ‘duel and state war’, ‘absolute war and real war’. Book I Chapter 1 of On War is a conceptual framework for the whole book which provides a consistent perspective on the success and failure of Napoleon's conduct of war in the empirical cases. Jena/Auerstedt(1806) campaign was a empirical prototype for a absolute war, but Napoleon's failure in Moscow(1812) and Waterloo(1815) campaigns motivated Clausewitz to turn his early thought on nature of war to the real war paradigm. ‘Absolute war-paradigm’ of the Jena(1806) is ‘early Clausewitz’ and ‘real war-paradigm’ of the moscow/waterloo(1812/1815) is ‘later Clausewitz’. Clausewitz tried to integrate this different and opposite nature of two types of war into a single war theory based on a ‘wondrous trinity of war’. Clausewitz tried to clarify the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation of the war, and the relationship ‘wondrous trinity’(primordial violence-chance and probability - reason alone) and ‘dual nature of war(chameleon)’. According to Clausewitz, it does not exist a absolute war in the real world. The reason why Clausewitz provide a absolute war in the book was just to show a reference point for setting a theory, which never takes place in the reality. Lastly, this article implies that the nature of war(book I. chapter 1 of on war) is closely associated with a matter of military strategy. As explained clearly in the empirical cases of Jena, Moscow and Waterloo, ‘war and strategy’ cannot be separated. The most cause/motive of Clausewitz was “why Napoleon won or lost the war?”. Clausewitz dealt with the nature of war in the first chapter of his book just to answer his main question in the later part. Clausewitz' main interest was actually focused on a ‘strategy’ and ‘war planning’ in the following parts of his book. This is the reason why we have to read Book I Chapter 1 of On War carefully before we start to study ‘strategy’.

The Real Nature of the ‘daein(大人)’ and the 'daedaero(大對盧)' in late Goguryeo

Yoon, Seong-Hwan | 2015, (95) | pp.231~279 | number of Cited : 3

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Reexamination of Battles that involved islands (located in the middle of the sea) during the War against the Mongol Invasion forces

KyeongJin Yoon | 2015, (95) | pp.281~331 | number of Cited : 3

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Examined in this article are the battles that took place over the sea or in coastline areas, between the defending Goryeo forces and the invading Mongol troops, during the early 13th century. The issue became a rather sensitive topic recently, and a renewed perspective of that issue is required. Previously, “Jodo(槽島)” was believed to have been an island in the vicinity of the Seohae province(西海道), but at that time, Seohae-do was only upon the route that led to the Gaegyeong(開京) capital of Goryeo, and there is no indication that an assault upon the islands was launched from this location. Instead, right after the Jodo battle, in response to the Mongol troops’ overall offensive targeting islands in the sea, the Goryeo government dispatched troops to the Jeolla-do(全羅道). Considering such move, and the whereabouts of the Mongol main battalion, it would be reasonable to assume that Jodo was located in a position near that province, which was certainly better equipped and prepared, in terms of supporting the government’s defense efforts that would have most definitely included ship building. The so-called “A-ju island(牙州海島)” battle was not a battle that took place upon the sea, as it was fought by Goryeo troops which returned (from the island) to the land. And considering other references in key records, which depicted the Mongol troops’ continuing offensive against the Chungju(忠州) area, it would be hard to describe the outcome of this battle as a victory for the Goryeo troops. The island in question seems to have been the Daebu-do(大府島), where a rather large military forces composed of Chungju soldiers was stationed. Han Chwi(韓就), the Sunmun-Sa(Provincial Magistrate in the region : 巡問使) of Chungju-do(忠州道), was not a military commander but a civilian official who received an order from the government to secure necessary number of troops for upcoming missions. Shortly after that, Goryeo troops tried to prevent Mongol forces from attacking Chungju, but failed, and as a result Chungju fell.

Re-conquest of the Pajeo River and Policies for Conquering the foreign territory During the Reign of King Sejong of Joseon Dyansty

Kyuchul Lee | 2015, (95) | pp.333~361 | number of Cited : 8

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During the period of Sejong's reign over the Joseon, the policy for conquering foreign powers began discussing more seriously. Since the foundation of the Joseon, it had continued to show interests in the northern regions. In addition, the King Taejo and Taejong strived to secure influence in the surrounding areas of Amnok River and the Duman River, taking into account the relationship with the Ming. One of these representative foreign policies of the Joseon was the 'conquest' against the savages. In the face of strong protest from the retainers, Sejong was determined to carry out the re-conquest of the regions surrounding the Pajeo River. This showed that Sejong had expanded his political power over the country as a result of the first conquest. The ultimate goal of the Joseon occupying the Pajeo River again was to capture Lee Man Ju, chief of the barbarians called Jurchen. This was because the Joseon had an intention to spread its clout around by removing the figure playing a pivotal role within the Jurchen population in the region of Geonju-wi. More importantly, it was the struggle with the Ming to gain the upper hand over the hegemony of the Jurchen group centering on the whole area of the Amnok River. It seems to me that the Joseon would not shut its eyes to the groups led by Lee Manju, who received the approval from the Ming to move them in the Pajeo River area that the Joseon considered under its influence. Besides, the Lee Manju group put more emphasis on a close rapport with the Ming rather than with the Joseon. The Joseon, therefore, sought to obtain the actual control over the entire area of the Amnok River by getting rid of the forces of Lee Manju. The foreign policy for conquests outside the Joseon was the most suitable and useful one to attack external influences using military strength and take advantage of the achievements. It's because such conquest policy could have an impact on foreign powers as well as domestic groups. This is why foreign subjugation became a proper type of policy that can be politically used in various ways. Since despite the fact that there was a high possibility of failure, if it was successful, it would be expected to produce a bigger fruit, King Sejong took the lead to push ahead and carry out the conquest even when facing strong objection from his subjects.

The Activities of Japanese Armed forces in Kyeongsang Province in the Early Period of Imjin War : Battle of Yeongcheon Fortress

Kim Kyong tae | 2015, (95) | pp.363~394 | number of Cited : 16

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To evaluate the activities of the righteous voluntary army during the Imjin War period, it is imperative to grasp those of their adversaries, the Japanese army. Researches up until now have not focused on the activities of the Japanese army and some of them even illustrated the circumstances based on inappropriate grounds. Every battle needs at least one army and its counterpart. Without analyzing the adversaries and the materials written by them, it is hard to fully reconstruct the circumstances of a battle only with the materials written by people of Joseon to reflect it's perspective. This is why we need to understand the activities of the Japanese army using Japanese historical records. During the war, the Japanese army moved on war footing directed by the order of deployment of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. They had to follow Hideyoshi’s grand strategy of invading Ming China. Yet each troop consisted of a general, his vassals, and the soldiers under their command and it had to procure its own rations and forces. How they procure the provisions was up to the judgement of the general: he had to make his own decision whether to pillage, to transport them from its domain, or to rent. He was also given mandate to decide what kind of tactics they would take for the battles during the army’s advancing or stationing. The independent nature which each troop assumed renders it hard to trace the Japanese troops; information on the Japanese army, such as to whom the troop belonged, who participated in the battle, is hard to find from historical records. And this is why it is hard to grasp the Japanese army who fought against the righteous voluntary army at Yeongcheon fortress. Using various orders of deployment issued by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, this article argues that the Japanese army who participated in the Battle of Yeongcheon Fortress must have been small scale troops which entered Joseon after the 9th troops or troops under the Mori Terumoto and Toyotomi Hidekatsu. Meanwhile, from the records of the troops under Terumoto, this article traced the activities of the Japanese Army in Kyeongsang Province during the period of Yeongcheon fortress. From the early phase of war, pillage and violence by the Japanese army incurred strong resistance of Joseon people. Yet the Japanese army could not cope with situation and the righteous army staged a series of riots here and there. After the battle at Yeongcheon Fortress, the Japanese army suffered repeated defeats at subsequent battles of similar scale. After that, the main body of the Japanese army assembled along the line from Hanseong to Pyeongyang in order to defend the region from their new enemy, Ming army. The remnant troops left in Kyeongsang Province retreated from their various posts and gathered into positions where they could easily defend themselves. This made it possible for Joseon to recover the region which was exploited as main passage and posts of the Japanese army.

The aspects of the Activities of Goseong Righteous voluntary Army (義兵) during the Imjin War

Sin, Yun-Ho | 2015, (95) | pp.395~426 | number of Cited : 2

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During the early period of Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592, national defense power of Joseon Dynasty had proved its vulnerability in comparison with strong military strengths of Japan, and the entire territory of Joseon except Honam had fall into the hands of Japanese armed forces within two months. Despite the remarkable differences between the military strengths of Joseon and Japan, the major strengths for Joseon to overcome the invasion had rooted from voluntary civilians troops raised for Justice. It is true that deployment of Ming troops had played an important role in the process but, the nationwide movements of voluntary civilian troops had raised civil armies of tens and thousands soldiers all over the country, and pressurized Japanese military forces through guerilla tactics. One of the great examples of such voluntary civilian forces' acts is the ones of Goseong region. Goseong is located in a costal area, and thus, was exposed to the enemy forces both from the land and the sea. During the early periods of the invasion, rampancy of Japanese army in the region was beyond description. Japanese naval force had invaded from the southern sea, defeated the Gyeongsang Left Wing Naval Army led by Won Gyun, and made its way into Jinhae, Goseong and Sacheon while land force of Japan invaded by land through Changwon, Haman and Jinhae. Japanese commanders those who had occupied Goseong through naval paths were Gamei Korenori and Horinouchi Ujiyoshi. They were among the Japanese forces that had invaded Joseon through the southern sea with fleet of vessels. Movements of voluntary civilians against these invasions were very active and bodacious, and the greatest examples of such movements in Goseong region are the civil troops' actions raised by Choi Gyun, Choi Gang, Lee Dal and An Shin-gab. Their activities area was very broad including Jinju, Sacheon, Jinhae, Changwon and Woongcheon on top of Goseong. For their forms of activities, in particular, roles in logistics and combat activities were assigned on people separatedly, and the troops were managed efficiently. They set their military headquarter in a location safe from enemy forces so that elders, females and children can concentrate on logistic activities such as military procurement while young men including Choi Gang, Lee Dal and An Shin-gab formed combat units and mounted guerilla actions from different locations around the military commanding posts. Choi Gyun was already an aged man at the time. He was a man of great intelligence and possessed great knowledge on military tactics, and therefore, stayed in the headquarter to organize combat strategies and to work on overall management of the troops. 『Ssang Chung Rok (雙忠錄)』(1823) and 『Ssang Chung Sil Gi (雙忠實紀)』(1929), books containing texts and documents left by Choi Gyun and Choi Gang and records of their activities, are the major historical sources to examine voluntary civilian movement in Goseong. Since these are the sources of great significance, a thorough review of their historical accuracy is required. 『Ssang Chung Rok』is a recording of great activities of the brothers Choi Gyun and Choi Gang, and Ssang Chung Sil Gi』is a revised and expanded version of the former. These two books were published 200 years after the invasion, and thus, some contradictions were observed in many aspects including dates and terms. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a through examination in comparison to other sources. Activities of Jo Eung-do and Park Ae-sang, the government officers of Goseong at the time of Jung Yu Jae-ran, and they had died in a navel battle near Geojedo Island. After that, Japanese forces had re-occupied Goseong, and parts of Goseong Town Wall was modified into Japanese fortress. The Goseong Japanese Fortress was first examined by Japanese scholars during the Japanese colonial era. Currently, small parts of the fortress wall are still remaining since most parts of the fortress were demolished and replaced with private residential houses.

Gen. Choi Yongdeok's Achievements in the Aviational Independence Movement and His Role in the Korean Independence Army

Kidoong Kim , Changboo Kang , Lee Jiwon | 2015, (95) | pp.427~459 | number of Cited : 7

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KJCKorea
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military history 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.94

2015, Vol., No.95