@article{ART001998415},
author={Sangmun Suh},
title={Reargument of Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command : the Background and Process of Establishment},
journal={military history},
issn={1598-317X},
year={2015},
number={95},
pages={1-54},
doi={10.29212/mh.2015..95.1}
TY - JOUR
AU - Sangmun Suh
TI - Reargument of Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command : the Background and Process of Establishment
JO - military history
PY - 2015
VL - null
IS - 95
PB - Military History Institute, MND
SP - 1
EP - 54
SN - 1598-317X
AB - This research has found that it is probable that Beijing had demanded Pyeongyang to accept the military and political terms which were necessary to serve the war before sending its troops. Although the terms which Beijing suggested to Pyeongyang before dispatching troops were inevitable requirements to ensure its victory of war, the terms contained some factors that would limit military and political authority of Kim Il-sung, and eventually sovereignty of North Korea. The response of Kim Il-Sung at first was refusal. It was not surprising to see him refusing China's requirements because accepting them meant the higher possibility of political downfall of Kim Il-Sung himself and infringement of national sovereignty and military control.
Despite Pyeongyang's refusing to accept the terms, Mao Zedong(毛澤東) had constantly delivered his message to Pyeongyang, at least five times, to combine China and North Korea military commands through various communication routes, after the Chinese People's Volunteer Army(PVA) entered North Korea from late October to late November. Mao's suggestion meant the coercive pressure imposed on Kim to accept the terms. However, Kim had no intention to build an alliance between the troops. As such, Kim merely responded to Mao that the two troops will conduct operations under each command and cooperate with each other if needed.
Because Kim constantly denied the alliance, Mao tactically used Stalin's authority to make Kim, Shtikov, a Soviet ambassador to North Korea, and Soviet military advisers agree on the unity of command between China and North Korea. Stalin recognized China’s long-term war strategy for his strategic intention which contains a goal of continual power consumption of China and U.S. in the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, Stalin accepted Mao’s request which was to make Kim and Soviet advisers agree on the alliance and then he summoned the ambassador and military advisers to North Korea to make them take the responsibility of the failure of North Korea's invasion to South Korea. Kim, who had not even moved by Gao Gang(高崗) sent by Mao, agreed on the alliance because of the supports and pressure from Stalin who had started to trust Kim just then. Kim had finally begun to cooperate to Mao after achieving supports from Stalin, which led to establish the Sino-North Korea combined forces command; before then, Kim had distrusted Beijing due to his fear to be deprived of his power. It means that Stalin’s support was prior to that of Mao for Kim.
Meanwhile, it can be evaluated that China accomplished its original purpose by strategically using Kim's surrounding situational vulnerability, although the original terms had to go through a few modifications. In conclusion, the Sino-North Korea combined forces command was a result of political compromise between Kim Il-sung and Mao Zedong to achieve their own respective interests.
KW - Korean War;Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command;Dispatching China troops to Korean War;Sino-North Korea Combined Forces
DO - 10.29212/mh.2015..95.1
ER -
Sangmun Suh. (2015). Reargument of Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command : the Background and Process of Establishment. military history, 95, 1-54.
Sangmun Suh. 2015, "Reargument of Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command : the Background and Process of Establishment", military history, no.95, pp.1-54. Available from: doi:10.29212/mh.2015..95.1
Sangmun Suh "Reargument of Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command : the Background and Process of Establishment" military history 95 pp.1-54 (2015) : 1.
Sangmun Suh. Reargument of Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command : the Background and Process of Establishment. 2015; 95 : 1-54. Available from: doi:10.29212/mh.2015..95.1
Sangmun Suh. "Reargument of Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command : the Background and Process of Establishment" military history no.95(2015) : 1-54.doi: 10.29212/mh.2015..95.1
Sangmun Suh. Reargument of Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command : the Background and Process of Establishment. military history, 95, 1-54. doi: 10.29212/mh.2015..95.1
Sangmun Suh. Reargument of Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command : the Background and Process of Establishment. military history. 2015; 95 1-54. doi: 10.29212/mh.2015..95.1
Sangmun Suh. Reargument of Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command : the Background and Process of Establishment. 2015; 95 : 1-54. Available from: doi:10.29212/mh.2015..95.1
Sangmun Suh. "Reargument of Sino-North Korea Combined Forces Command : the Background and Process of Establishment" military history no.95(2015) : 1-54.doi: 10.29212/mh.2015..95.1