2025, Vol., No.136

Eisenhower Administration’s Korean Armistice Conception and the Role of the South Korean Military

Kyengho Son | 2025, (136) | pp.1~39 | number of Cited : 0

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ATIS(Allied Translator & Interprter Section) and Communist Chinese Forces POW Interrogation during the Korean War

Sangho Lee | 2025, (136) | pp.41~80 | number of Cited : 0

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This study aims to analyze the interrogators and how the information gathered by them was used in the interrogation of Chinese POWs during the Korean War. These interrogators can be divided into four main categories. They include US Far East Air Force agents, ATIS(Allied Translator & Interprter Section) agents, South Korean agents, and military intelligence Services agents. ATIS agents make up the majority of these, and most of them are Japanese-American second generation (Nisei). With the outbreak of the Korean War, ATIS rapidly reorganized the ATIS Frontline Unit (ADVATIS) on July 7, 1950, to be deployed to the Korean front. ADVATIS was responsible for interrogating North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war, sorting, organizing, and translating North Korean captured documents sent by each detachment and division, categorizing them into strategic and tactical information, and transferring them to ATIS headquarters in Tokyo. ADVATIS's work was enormous. As of December 2, 1950, it had conducted the initial screening of 95,000 POWs, interrogated 1,760 of them, and prepared 2,788 interrogation reports. In addition, it had organized, evaluated, and translated 18 tons of captured documents. In addition to POW interrogation, ATIS began to systematically translate documents seized or captured from the Chinese military. The Enemy Documents series is a representative example. The information was also categorized and organized into Tactical Intelligence and Geographic Intelligence. In the end, most of the POW communications on the North Korean Army and the Chinese Communist Army were produced by Nisei, which made an important contribution to the conduct of the war by providing the UN forces with vital information on the North Korean Army and the Chinese Communist Army's battle order, command system, and means of combat that combat units needed.

Historical Characteristics of the Victory of Seongju(成州) Kiamseong(岐巖城) Battle in Bukkye(北界) Province in 1259

Jaegwang Kang | 2025, (136) | pp.81~117 | number of Cited : 0

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According to the maps of the late Joseon Dynasty, 『Dongyeodo(東輿圖)』, 『Daedongyeojido(大東輿地圖)』, and 『Daedongbangyeojedo(大東方輿全圖)』, Seongju(成州) Kiamseong (岐巖城) was a stone castle located on the left side of Dumi Mountain(頭尾山) in Samgi-myeon(三岐面: now Samdeokmyeon( 三德面), Seongcheon-gun(成川郡), Pyeongannamdo, North Korea). The Battle against Mongol army took place in January 1259 (the 46th year of King Gojong’s reign), and the troop of Yabyeolcho(夜別抄) and Seongju people cooperated with each other to defeat a Mongol army unit that is believed to have been led by a Mongol general, Bopadae(甫波大). The Battle of Kiamseong was the last victory of Goryeo in Bukkye (北界) at the end of the 6th invasion of Mongolia (1254-1259) and the only victory of the military, government, and people in cooperation. A unit of Yabyeolcho was already dispatched to Kiamseong in 1258, and Jiyu(指諭) of Yabyeolcho, who is believed to have acted as a Banghobyulgam(防護別監), commanded the soldiers of Yabyeolcho(about 200 soldiers) and the people of Seongju to repel the Mongol cavalry. The main reason for the victory of the Battle of Kiamseong was that the Kiamseong Fortress was surrounded by the Biryu River(沸流江) and Gijanghucheon River and was located in a relatively rugged mountainous area, which was advantageous for defending the enemy, that Yabyeolcho, the best military force of Goryeo, was involved in the battle, and that the castle residents’ fighting capabilities, which had never been invaded by Mongol forces until the 5th invasion of Mongol, were maintained until 1259. As a result of the victory of this battle, the Mongol army stationed in Bukkye no longer attacked various fortresses in the Northern Territories of Goryeo, and the the peace negotiations between Goryeo and Mongol on the condition of Taejachinjo(太子親朝) were accelerated, eventually contributing to the conclusion of the peace negotiations toward Mongol in April 1259.

A study on the origin of duk and Rite of Duk that was transmitted the Chosŏn

Daeyeong Heo | 2025, (136) | pp.119~157 | number of Cited : 0

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A Review of Crossbow(弩) Operations in the Late Joseon Dynasty - Focusing on its Relationship with Battle Tactics and Discourse

Koo Yeol-Hoi | 2025, (136) | pp.159~199 | number of Cited : 0

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The crossbow(弩), which was actively used as a long-range weapon during the Three Kingdoms and Goryeo periods, continued to be used in the early Joseon Dynasty but seemed to decline with the introduction of the matchlock gun after the Imjin War. However, surprisingly, during the reigns of Sukjong to Jeongjo, discussions about the use of the crossbow, which should have been phased out, actually became more active and were reflected to some extent in national defense policy and weapon manufacturing. From a global historical perspective, it is a peculiar aspect of the late Joseon Dynasty that the crossbow, which should have been eliminated with the advent of firearms, was re-evaluated over time. This was due to the discourse environment, fiscal-military situation, and the relationship with battle tactics and strategies in Joseon society at the time. Rather, there was a context in which the crossbow was highlighted as a supplementary weapon precisely because matchlock guns and other firearms had become the primary weapons. However, the discussions among intellectuals were not consistent. While there was officials agreement with authorities and policies regarding ballista, there were significant divergences concerning personal crossbows. On the other hand, regarding personal crossbows, officials recognized the direction of using the crossbow as a supplementary weapon to the matchlock gun and sought to add characteristics different from the typical "one shot, one arrow" crossbows of the past. Thus, during the reigns of Sukjong to Yeongjo, the focus was on developing crossbows similar to shotguns, capable of "one shot, multiple arrows." This then led to the development of magazine-fed repeating crossbows during the reign of Jeongjo, which while still "one shot, one arrow," possessed rapid firing capabilities akin to machine guns. Through this, the research primarily aims to supplement existing studies that have not thoroughly covered crossbows in the late Joseon Dynasty. Secondly, it seeks to elucidate the historical context and significance of the peculiar phase of weapon development in the late Joseon Dynasty.

Airpower in Limited War Under Nuclear Deterrence : A Case Study of the India-Pakistan Conflict

진서영 , 황윤성 | 2025, (136) | pp.201~239 | number of Cited : 0

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Strategic Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Corvus in the First Punic War

Sangyeop, Kim | 2025, (136) | pp.241~274 | number of Cited : 0

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The use of the corvus during the First Punic War serves as a significant case study demonstrating how technological innovation interacts with military strategy, operational efficiency, and long-term force development. The corvus was neither a complete success nor an outright failure; rather, it functioned as a transitional technology. In the short term, it helped Rome overcome its naval inferiority, but it also exposed new strategic vulnerabilities, such as reduced ship maneuverability. Nevertheless, the corvus acted as a force multiplier at a critical moment in the rise of the Roman navy, enabling the Romans to leverage their strength in infantry tactics even at sea. This tactical adaptation played a key role in narrowing the power gap with Carthage—a dominant naval force—and securing early Roman victories that would have been difficult through conventional naval engagements. However, the corvus design compromised ship stability and agility, making Roman vessels vulnerable to environmental conditions and enemy tactics. The resulting losses tested Rome's resilience and institutional adaptability, illustrating that technological solutions often generate new challenges alongside potential advantages. The corvus also highlights that overreliance on a single innovation without balanced development of foundational capabilities can hinder long-term progress. While innovation can offer short-term operational advantages, its sustainability depends on organizational flexibility, learning capacity, and strategic foresight. Rome initially employed the corvus actively, but as its sailors became more experienced, it eventually phased out the device in favor of traditional naval tactics focused on maneuverability and coordination. This shift underscores that lasting strategic superiority comes not from temporary tactical tools but from cultivating fundamental maritime operational capabilities. Thus, the corvus was not merely a piece of equipment but a reflection of Rome’s evolving mode of warfare and military identity. By integrating land-based tactics into naval battles, Rome blurred conventional boundaries between warfighting domains and demonstrated its capacity to adapt flexibly to diverse combat environments. In this sense, the corvus symbolized Roman creativity and resilience in the face of asymmetric challenges. The insights drawn from this case extend beyond ancient military history and remain relevant to modern armed forces. Today’s militaries face similar challenges: how to effectively integrate new technologies, avoid overdependence on single solutions, and balance core competencies with innovation. The corvus case illustrates that military innovation is not a fixed outcome but an ongoing, iterative process of evaluation and adaptation. Without strategic thinking and continuous reassessment, technological advancements may ultimately weaken rather than strengthen military power.

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military history 2024 KCI Impact Factor : 1.07

2025, Vol., No.136